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ABSTRACT
This study explores public sector union behavior under conditions
of economic constraint which impose a trade-off between employment
and wages. A property tax limitation bill, Proposition 2 1/2,
was passed in Massachusetts in 1980. The bill limited the ability
of local governments to pay their employees and also altered the
attitudes of management and labor and the balance of power between
them. A case study of police and fire unions in the Town of Belmont
was done to explore union reaction to the changed context of labor
relations. The study attempts to explain why, when each union was
offered a choice between layoffs and a reduction in a negotiated
wage increase, each chose a different alternative. It was found
that the alternatives entailed other costs to the membership
beyond the wage cut and layoffs which determined the different
outcomes.
The study places the case of Belmont in the context of the
industrial and public sector labor relations literature. That
concerning employment and wage relationships was synthesized and
used to predict the behavior of the unions. The findings of the
case indicate that such literature did not serve to fully explain
union objectives and behavior. Factors outside the traditional
employment/wage considerations were critical in determining
outcomes, particularly the organization of the work place and of
the work itself, and the strength of the union, derived from its
external and internal relationships.
Thesis Supervisor: Martin Rein, Professor of Sociology
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Preface
Job security has been the essence of public employment. Good wages
were not deemed to be necessary because of this security, or in other
perspectives, because of the "prestige of public employment." With
the advent of public sector unionization, both rationales were challenged.
It was obvious that the public worker wanted the same economic benefits
as those in the private sector. Higher wages did not decrease employ-
ment, however, as municipal coffers were expanded to absorb the employee
demands. It was assumed that any trade-off between wages and employ-
ment, as found in the competitive market, was irrelevant to public
employment.
The mid 1970's saw a fundamental change in the fiscal viability of
local government. The threat of default in New York City was not
paralleled everywhere, but it was a reflection of a broad change
throughout the nation in the ability of government to continually
absorb higher costs. The attempt to cope with fiscal constraint
(and distress) led to cutbacks in personnel appropriations, and resulted
in, perhaps for the first time, layoffs of public employees. It had
become obvious that insulation from job insecurity was no longer possible,
and that higher wages and increased employment could not co-exist.
It appeared that the trade-off had arrived in the public sector.
As job security has been assumed in public employment, and never
been challenged despite wage increases, there was little indication of
how unions would react. Considerable literature in private sector
labor relations had been generated around the topic, but based predomi-
nately in the competitive economic context of the market, where links
between price and demand were inherent. But because public employee
unions had operated under no such context, it was not clear that the
same objectives could be attributed to them.
In November, 1980, Massachusetts residents overwhelmingly voted
to approve a property tax limitation bill, Proposition 2 , which was
to have considerable impact on municipal revenues, and thus public
employment. In February, the Boston Globe published an article head-
lined under "Proposition 2 Axe Dulled By Sacrifice." In it was des-
cribed a decision by the police union in the town of Belmont to take
a wage reduction in order to prevent layoffs. At the same time, it
was mentioned that the firefighters' union had rejected the option and
seven men had been laid off. The case seemed a prime opportunity to
explore the factors which determined the outcome of a trade-off between
employment and wages.
The study which follows is essentially an effort to understand
through the case of Belmont how public employee unions perceive and
determine a trade-off between wages and employment. It is the under-
lying assumption that union objectives and their ability to obtain are
the heart of issue, and that understanding a decision will better
enlighten the concept of what unions are to their membership.
The first chapter attempts to outline the major theories that
have been developed in the labor relations field in relation to a
decision between wages and employment. As the existence of a trade-off
has always faced a private sector union, the heart of this work has
been in industrial labor relations, and leads the discussion. Following
is a section outlining the critical differences in public employment
with particular attention to municipal government and police and fire
unions, and how these affect the formulation of unions' goal. How
these relations are affected by fiscal constraint is discussed in the
third section, as well as providing synthesis of what the literature
offers in terms of predicting outcome. A final note is added concerning
the special nature of constraint imposed "willingly," such as in the
public approval of Proposition 2 , and the particular implications of
such.
The case of the Belmont unions is described in the second chapter,
beginning with a brief description of the particulars of labor relations
in the state which are relevant to the case. The final chapter links
back to the first, in discussing what might have been predicted through
the literature and how that compares to the findings in Belmont.
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CHAPTER I. THE THEORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT/WAGE TRADE-OFF
The Private Sector
Economic constraint is not an unusual phenomenon in private sector
labor relations. Indeed, because employment is deeply imbedded in the
market system under capitalism, the representatives of employees --
unions -- are intrinsically bound to an economic relationship with the
micro-and macro-level economy. The domination of price in the alloca-
tion of resources demands a response to union behavior in the distribu-
tion and level of general employment, and, until the entire labor force
is unionized, in competition from the non-unionized sector. The issue
of a trade-off between wages and employment is indisputably part of
the context of union behavior; the question for research has been the
degree of consciousness with which the trade-off has affected union
goal and strategy formulation. The discussion of trade-offs is embodied
in the literature in general concern with wage determination as
affected by the existence of unions. Collective action by workers is
perceived in the classical model as an interference in what might have
been market decision, therefore requiring explanation outside traditional
economic theory. The literature has largely dealt with wage determination
and its interplay with employment levels and other relationships of
work as an outcome of a complex process involving union and management
goals and ability to obtain them, set in an economic, social, and
political environment. The separation and weighing of the different
variables involved in the process has been the stimulus for competing
theories in the past, and judging from the current state of the art,
of numerous more in the future.
Though a trade-off between wages and employment has been implicit
in classical economics, its explicit consideration in the formulation
of union goals and wage policy was not necessarily assumed. The early
writers on unionism had generated a variety of alternative hypotheses
explaining the existence and purpose of unions. Some, such as the
Webbs, viewed organized labor in a historical perspective, arising
out of the nature of capitalism, and in the pursuit of fundamental
transformation of society away from capitalistic competition. Perlman,
from a different perspective, viewed the primary interest of the worker
as job security, the motivation for unionism as a concern with the
scarcity of job opportunities.2 With the firm establishment of business
unionism in the United States, focus turned to more specific consideration
of union policy, particularly the search for an economic model. Hicks
provided a somewhat primative version in 1932 with the belief that the
union strives to obtain the highest wage possible without concern for
employment.3
ISidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (London: Longmans,
1897). Marx and later Lenin also viewed the advent of unionism as
arising from the capitalistic mode of production; however, they
were critical of the narrow, economistic goals of the existing trade
unionism and did not foresee fundamental societal transformation as
possible without revolution, in contrast to the Webbs' belief in
gradual improvement in which unions played a key role.
2Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: Macmillan,
1928.
3J. R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages (London: Macmillan, 1935).
With the publication of John Dunlop's book, Wage Determination
Under Trade Unions in 1944, an elaborate economic model for union
behavior was outlined. 4
Dunlop specifically placed a consciousness of employment tradeoffs
in the union policy formulation. His view of the union was as a business
enterprise, in the business of selling labor in a market economy. Its
primary motivation was the maximization of the total wage bill, implying
that wage increases would only be sought until the loss of employment
decreased total wages below that gained by remaining workers. The
union functioned as a sophisticated economic entity, acting as a rational
maximizer of wage. (Dunlop did admit, however, that wage policies might
be utilized for other than income-gaining reasons though these were
sub-goals.)
The trade-off between wage increases and employment was understood
by the union but only through "specific channels," not in an abstract
over-all elasticity of demand relative to the general economy. The more
immediate and direct the employment reaction to a wage change (especially
evident with non-union competition), the more clearly the union will
perceive the relationship. Any attempt by a particular union to gain
employment guarantees recognized the employment-wage-rate relationship,
and it was assumed that some portion of wages were given up in the bargaining
process in return for such guarantees.
Dunlop also attempte'd to model the behavior of a union facing a
worsened economic context, such as a down-turn in the business cycle,
4John Dunlop, Wage Determination Under Trade Unions. (New York:
August M. Kelley, 1950).
in which a union was faced with taking a wage reduction to prevent loss
of employment. He postulated that in general unions would not take a
wage reduction for a number of reasons, including the fact that the
achievements of the union were reflected by the base rate (and thus a
reduction would lower status), and that employed members would oppose a
cut and have more weight than the unemployed in a decision. The decision
would depend upon the degree of certainty over the length of the economic
cycle, the perceived costs in terms of the ability to regain the lost
wage, and probability of relative shifts in employment between union and
non-union firms. In the final analysis, however, Dunlop stated that a
decision might be contingent on the degree of pressure from the employer
(determined by the status of the firm's product in the market) rather
than from unemployment.
The ability of a union to obtain its objectives, in this theory
the desired wage level, was also primarily dependent upon market forces.
The critical factors were the preferences of workers and employers for
wages and man-hours, the degree of competition in the market, and the
actual wage and its relationship to an equilibrium weight. Dunlop
added that non-market factors, such as toughness or the degree of in-
formation concerning the opposition, might have some impact if other
factors were equal.
Dunlop's theory was thus intrinsically an economic model of union
behavior which incorporated trade-offs between wages and employment in
5In this, Dunlop identified that clusters of product markets related
to each other through economic conditions were significant.
formulation of its goals. Though he admitted that the union was a
decision-making unit, his model implied that the union was a coherent
whole, acting with specific, and predictable, purpose which lay entirely
in the economic sphere. The nature of its demands, its wage policy,
would vary with the definition of wage earners taken into account, the
formal bargaining unit (i.e., whether at the plant level or a larger
jurisdiction), the nature of competition in the product market, and the
expected time span for adjustments from union actions. The outcome of
a wage employment trade-off could be predicted but only with knowledge
of the above conditions and would depend fundamentally on competition
in the product market.
Six years later, Arthur Ross published Trade Union Wage Policy in
which much of Dunlop's theory was sharply disputed.6 A debate was begun
between the two perspectives, which continued for some time.
In Ross' theory, union wage policy was not to be found in the
"1mechanical application of any maximization principle" but rather in
the means by which union leaders reconciled various pressures in order
to "build the union." The union, in Ross' model, was primarily a
political organization operating in an economic environment, and not
the single actor which Dunlop had described. Its ultimate objective
was not maximization of income, either for all or part of the membership,
but self-preservation. The formal rationale of the union was still
6Arthur Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy. Berkely: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1950.
viewed as the enhancement of the economic welfare of its members;
however, this purpose was subservient to the more vital institutional
objective of survival and growth of the organization, which would take
precedence when the two objectives conflicted.
Because Ross approaches the union as an organization, rather than
a single "rational actor," he looks to the nature of relationships
within and without the bargaining unit for explanations of union behavior.
In his view, the union leader is the ultimate decision-maker, who moderates
the various pressures arising from members, management, the broader union
organization, and the general political and economic environment of the
nation, but who is also endowed with more foresight and knowledge than
membership, and thus can take responsibility for the union as an organiza-
tion. Thus, bargaining power in Ross' theory was coached more in terms
of the union's ability to survive than in influence over the wage. Ross
did not ignore the market forces of competition from which union power
was essentially derived, but saw them as affecting the range of choices
available rather than determining outcomes of union behavior.
The role of the employment/wage trade-off as a conscious factor
in wage policy formulation is refuted, for one, because the general
employment effect of an individual wage bargain is minimal, covering
only a small portion of the economy in most cases, and two, the relation-
ship between the wage and employment is not direct, nor predictable.
Such a relationship within a single firm is no less unpredictable, due
to considerable "free play" between wage rates and labor costs, labor
costs and total costs, total cost and selling price, and selling price
and employment volume. 7 Ross purports that the "responsible wage policy"
which takes into consideration the employment effect, is almost always
impossible to fulfill. Rather, the wage policy which results, with its
(indirect) impact on employment, is the outcome of the political process
surrounding the union leader; the appropriate reconciliation of various
pressures will depend "on the relative urgency of the pressures." Varia-
tions in behavior of unions is not accounted for by varying degrees of
enlightenment, but rather different range of choices, offered by the
nature of the political pressures on the leadership and the economic
context. Ross' image of the "responsible wage policy" highlighted
industrial peace more than full employment.
In Ross' theory, the outcome of a specific wage/employment trade-
off, such as that which might arise during a depression when an employer
requested a wage reduction to preserve employment, would not be determined
primarily through economic considerations. For one, the union would
not be able to determine with certainty the employment impacts of a
wage reduction; risk would lessen the attractiveness of the proposal.
The membership, still a majority of those employed, would not be happy
with reduced income and pressure for rejection. The two would combine
It is interesting to note that other theorists of the same time period,
Belfer and Bloom, had found that union action itself had sufficiently
altered the substitutability of workers within a firm through rules on
speed of production, hiring and firing so that marginal productivity
was rendered indeterminate; unions were able to raise wages without
causing unemployment as normally dictated by rational economic behavior.
Nathan Belfer and Gordon Bloom, "Unionism and the Marginal Productivity
Theory," in Lester and Shister, eds., Insights Into Labor Issues, New
York: Macmillan & Co., 1949.
to make the political risk to the union leader of taking a reduction
considerable. According to Ross, however, rejection of the reduction was
not inevitable; because the union leader also desired to maintain peace
with the employer and therefore assure continuation of the bargaining
relationship, he might be induced to take such a cut under extreme
pressure from the employer. That the magnitude of pressure from the
employer was dependent upon market forces (the pressure on product
price) did not alter the fact that union behavior lay outside the con-
text of unemployment considerations.
There was another important element in Ross' theory concerning
union wage policy. According to Ross, relative wage levels, rather
than absolute level, were more important to union membership, enabling
them to distinguish between a good and bad deal. Because this was to
be a measure of success of a union leader -- and success meant preserva-
tion of the leader and the union -- the concern during negotiations was
guided by such relative standards. To Ross, members related their wage
to two main factors, inflation and comparison with other wage levels.
The latter was made primarily within "orbits of coervive comparison,"
an entity that partially was determined through links in the labor and
product markets, but also through political factors such as employer
and union organization.
In sum, Dunlop's model had postulated why a union should be concerned
with employment/wage trade-offs and had assumed that the trade-off would
be taken into consideration in formulating wage policy. Ross offered
reasons why such a trade-off was not and could not be a major considera-
tion and provided an alternative rationale for the determination of
wages under unionism, using a perspective beyond economic theory. Both
assumed an inherent rationality to union behavior, though the form and
objectives of each was quite different. Dunlop's union was fundamentally
a single entity acting in pursuit of one economic goal; Ross's was not,
though decision making was centralized in one person, the union leader,
who moderated interests and insured the basic organizational and economic
goals of the union were pursued.
Ross' hypothesis, that the relative wage rate was more important
than the actual level, links union behavior to the macro economy.
Insofar as unions determine the wage level through their actions,
there are impacts from such determination on inflation and unemployment.
Though Ross essentially alleviated the union from responsibility for
such impacts (because of the impossibility of making such connections at
the local level) and maintained that macro-economy considerations were
not part of the formulation of union objectives, the relationship
between the two has inspired much of the literature on unions, and, in
part, forced a closer examination of union behavior.
Ross' theory became part of a greater attempt to explain a phenomenon
in the United States economy that went against the laws of supply and
demand. It had been observed that wages were more stable than employment,
in other words, that there was a wage rigidity which resulted in
fluctuations in employment. Supply and demand theory would dictate
that price (wage) should fluctuate. In the identification of importance
of comparison of wages, rather than actual level, Ross introduced an
institutional reason for such wage rigidity. Because of the nature of
unions as political organizations, the level of wages demanded could
not be permitted to fluctuate with changes in the competitiveness of
factors of production. The consequences of equalization and resulting
rigidity of wage, was unemployment.
Theorists continued to explore the existence of fluctuating employment
and more stable'wages, particularly among certain groups of industries.
Other institutional theories besides Ross' "orbits of coercive comparison"
were generated, including pattern bargaining--key bargains which are
first negotiated and set the base for other negotiations8 and customary
wage structures, whereby workers in the primary (including unionized)
sector, become attached to specific wage structures which spread a "shock"
to one point in a system throughout. 9 It should also be noted that
not all attempts to explain the seemingly irrational existence of
unemployment accept a non-economic model. Theories arising out of a
struggle to maintain the integrity of neo-classical economics have
included the "search theory," where a lag is required for employees to
gain information concerning job opportunities,10 and more recently,
8 Such authors as Otto Eckstein and Thomas Wilson ("The Determination Of
Money Wages In American Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
August 1962) and John Mather ("The Wage Pattern In The U.S.," Industrial
And Labor Relations Review, October 1961) discuss pattern bargaining.
9Michael Piore, "Fragments Of A Sociological Theory Of Wages," in Piore,
ed. Unemployment And Inflation, White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1979).
1 0Edmund Phelps, et al., Microeconomics Foundations of Employment and In-
flation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970).
the "implicit contract," whereby workers have an understanding with
employers that they will be rehired with an economic upturn, and thus
tolerate a stable wage rate despite (supposedly) temporary loss of
employment.11 As the macro level of analysis is not particularly
relevant to the rest of the study, it will not be discussed further,
though recognition is paid to inspiration it has provided to the
understanding of union behavior in general.
In general, it can be said that, at least in industrial fields,
the concept of a union as more than an economic actor came to prevail.
Though other disciplines have continued to search for theories of union
behavior within their own fields (in economics the maximization of
utility, in political economy the role of the union in class struggle,
in sociology, unionization of rebellion and co-option, etc.), industrial
relations has attempted to build a broader framework identifying the
various factors which may affect the formulation of union objectives and
their ability to gain them. The employment/wage trade-off has not
disappeared, particularly in outcome, but its position in the formulation
of union policy and strategy is no longer considered to be predetermined.
Analysis has also expanded the question somewhat; some theorists have
questioned the dominance of wage matters over other monetary or non-
monetary issues in union objectives. The trade-off may no longer be
purely wage versus employment but entail a considerable number of other
Costas Azariadis, "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria,"
Journal of Political Economy (1975).
matters, which also serve to increase the indeterminateness of such
trade-offs.
Though a variety of frameworks might be constructed, Dunlop
developed a particularly coherent approach to labor relations putting
union behavior within an industrial relations system, whereby actors
form relationships within an economic, technological, and political
context. The context influences both union objectives and strengths,
but does not displace the internal dynamics of a union (and management)
as an organizational entity. The environment has been defined as the
economic, the technological, and public policy (loci of power, and ideology
in greater society) contexts by Dunlop. The economic context includes
macro-level conditions, particularly rate of inflation (the higher the
rate the higher expectations for increased compensation) and proximity
to full employment (the closer to full employment, the greater the power
of unions); and micro level, where Marshall's13 argument that union
power is related to elasticity of demand -(the more inelastic the greater
the power). Industry concentration and rate of profit and productivity
also have impact on bargaining power.
The technological context is the type of work place and the content
of the work day, the features of the productive process which determine
the relationships of workers to each other, to machines, and to the
organization itself. It should be noted that there is considerable
13 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics. (New York: Macmillan,
1920.
variance in the importance to collective bargaining attached to
technology; to Marx it was a critical feature behind the formation of
the labor movement, to the mainstream industrial relations specialist,
it is irrelevant except in adjustments to technological change. Certain
characteristics in the technical environment have been postulated to
relate to union power and objectives, however, including (1) greater
worker solidarity with greater isolation of the work place, homogeneity
of skill, and relationship to residence, (2) the strategic position of
workers, whereby employers cannot resist and incur considerable cost from
a shutdown, (3) the potential spillover of work place operations into
the external environment, which inspires greater government intervention.
Greater conflict has also been observed in mass production technologies.
The political context includes both the location of power in
society and specific public policies which impact the labor relations
system. It has been noted that United States unions are traditionally
"business unions," lacking substantial ideology beyond the maintenance
of the capitalistic employer/employee relationship. The greater society
has generally tolerated unionization in this form. Legal and political
institutions have had considerable impact on both the ability of unions
to survive and the structure of collective bargaining. Essentially,
labor laws and the National Labor Relations Board regulate the balance
of power between labor and management, constraining tactics on both
sides. This has permitted top-down organization of the work force,
and perhaps affected the ideology and objectives of unionism. The
legal and political systems thus provide both power and constraint to
unions.
A demographic context might also seem to be important, as the
composition of union membership reflects the composition of the labor
force. It has been postulated that the faster the demographic change
in the labor force, and the greater the heterogeneity, the more internal
conflict will arise. A change in mix (from predominately white male to
non-male and female) also affects the nature of demands, as needs of
aspirations of worker may vary.
The union organization itself is no longer viewed as a "black box"
but rather as a complex organization, whereby different actors and groups
of actors with particular interests are formed into a system through
formal and informal relationships. At the base is the membership,
itself not necessarily a monolithic structure. Ross and Dunlop made
distinctions between the employed and unemployed members in their
different interests; others have commented on far greater diversity,
including differences between older and younger, skilled and unskilled.
The union leadership has similarly been identified as an independent
actor, a moderator as in Ross' theory, but also with its own preferences
and goals. Management, in its response to union behavior, is also a
critical actor, partially determining the quality of relations (con-
flictual versus cooperative). Structure of bargaining, or the scope
of the union (and management) and the location of the bargaining unit
in terms of the employer (plant, firm or industry) and the union organi-
zation (local versus national) has been identified as affecting the
balance of power with management and relationships within the union.
The greater the product and labor market unionized, the greater the
union influence. The degree of centralization and the breadth of
the union organization also has implications for responsive leadership
to local interests and circumstances as well as degrees of pressure to
conform. (Disenchantment with the union on the part of membership has
recently driven national leaders to focus back on local interests.)
Relationships with affiliates and other unions are important in pressuring
union behavior, particularly in conformance with national labor policies,
out of fear of rival unions, or in informal pattern bargaining.
Variables which affect the role of a trade-off between employment
and wages in union behavior are found within this framework. Union
objectives and power are derived out of the context -- economic, politi-
cal, and technical -- and the organizational characteristics of the union
itself. The above was essentially a partial list of factors which might
be relevant; their weighting has been the source of numerous studies,
with some, but by no means total, success in creating an accurate model
capable of predicting union behavior. Certainly membership interests,
leadership preferences, pressures from the context, and management
response to union objectives are fundamentally important to the formula-
tion of union goals. A major source of power has been traditionally
identified as that from the economic context, though structure and
organizational characteristics can be equally important, particularly
the scope of union membership, the location of negotiations in the
system, and the willingness or ability of membership to strike or
exert other pressure.
Objectives and power are not independent of each other. The
ability to gain, and what has been won, will have considerable influence
on what will be demanded. It is here that the trade-off between wages
and employment becomes muddled. Certainly if a union can obtain security
of employment, it will be able to press for other demands, but whether
a union will place that security above other interests is unclear. That
a trade-off exists in the current environment is indisputable (though
the shape of the curve varies from one sector to another and among
theorists) and it has major implications for union power. But is it
a conscious part of union goal formulation? Dunlop's economic model
answered a vehement yes, Ross attempted to refute that through the
inability of unions to assess the real trade-offs, and placing union
survival as primary. More recent theorists have attempted to use
formal testing techniques and surveys to determine preferences and power,
though the two have often been separated, making the issue of a trade-
off more difficult to discern. A Quality of Employment Survey in 1977
of union membership indicated that of those surveyed, the highest
priorities desired for leadership action were, in order of greatest
preference, (1) greater influence in the union itself, (2) more and
better fringes, (3) higher wages, and (4) job security. But this does
not necessarily speak to a trade-off, nor to the actual behavior of
unions in negotiations.
As Ross was instrumental in making clear, union leadership
is separate from the membership, and has the responsibility of both
preserving the union and its own power therefore the interests pursued
may be different. The latter implies that the demands a leader makes
may be contingent on the ability to gain them, as failure in negotiations
does little to maintain membership allegiance. Therefore, the visible
priorities and not necessarily intrinsic preferences of either membership
or leader. The responsibility for union survival includes not only
insuring that a union can continue to bargain with management but also
that there is a membership to bargain for (and from whose strength a
position to bargain from). Ultimately, employment becomes critical to
union preservation.
Perhaps a reconciliation of what emerges from the history of the
literature is that the existence of a conscious concern with employment
level as affected by wage demands varies with the situation. As Ross
indicated in 1950, the complexity of the economic system and of union
organization make it unrealistic that a trade-off be generally incor-
porated into the nature of objectives. Joseph Shister, in a discussion
on union-management cooperation,14 indicated, however, that there is a
critical point of unemployment beyond which a union will make cost
concessions. The critical point varies among unions and particularly
among different time periods (reflecting the role of context, organiza-
tion and power). It might therefore be interpreted that the relevancy
1 4 Joseph Shister, "Union-Management Cooperation: An Analysis," in
Lester and Shister, eds., Insights Into The Labor Movement, New
York: Macmillan Co., 1949.
of trade-off is dependent upon the circumstance, certainty and magni-
tude, of the wage effect, and may at times become critical in a union's
goal formulation. The choice between such a trade-off is also as
dependent on the circumstances; certainly there is not a general answer
for which side a union will take.
Public Sector Labor Relations: Under "Normal" Conditions
In most literature the major distinction drawn between public
and private sector labor relations lies in the nature of government
as provider of public services and representative of citizens. Apart
from philosophical arguments over the sovereignity of the employer and
its ability to recognize the collectivity of workers, 1 5 public employment
differs from private in the indirect role which the market plays.
Though in the long run employment structures are affected by general
market principles -- competition for labor with the private sector,
and the determination of the economic base from which revenues can be
derived -- the essential decisions of funding and allocating employment
are political rather than economic. Economic constraints of competition
which frame the existence of trade-offs between employment and wages
in the private sector do not hold.
There are a number of different arguments why the market forces
which affect private sector employment do not apply in the government
sphere. One such comes out of radical economics and its interpretation
of the role of the state in society. O'Connors, and other such economists,
have argued that the purpose of the state is to legitimize capitalism
and aid accumulation, and therefore is under pressure to provide services;
however, in order to fulfill its legitimization function, the reasons
given for employing workers have to be social or political rather than
-- The Hobbsian sovereignity concept was used for many years to justify
the government's refusal to accept union rights in the public sector.
Collective bargaining with the state meant joint, rather than uni-
lateral determination of employment conditions, and threatened the
government's allegiance to the public interest. For one discussion,
see, Joan Weitzman, The Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector,
New York: Praeger, 1975.
market or profitability criteria. Productivity and efficiency arguments
are therefore irrelevant; effectiveness of government is measured by
how well it promotes business prosperity and social peace.16
A different argument sees the beneficiary of government as the
elected official. In this light, public workers serve as voters and
as vote producers (thus the "new machine" emerging in major cities).1 7
Public employment has also traditionally served such other purposes
as integrating ethnic or other economic groups into society.1 8 The more
the importance of these functions of public employment (which may not
be contradictory except in the broader ideology), the less relevant
are economic forces.
In neo-classical theory the basic distinction between public and
private employment lies in the purported inelastic demand schedule for
the product and services which is also a key determinate of union power
under Marshallian theory. Government cannot bankrupt, or relocate,
and is not free to alter its product, the provision of essential services.
1 6 James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1973.
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in Daniel Hamermesh (ed.), Labor In The Public And Non-Profit Sectors,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.
1 8 Robert Fogelson, Big-City Police, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1977, is one among many who have perceived this as a function
of public employment.
Few substitutes for service provision exist in the private sector,
and due to nature of service provision itself, capital substitution for
labor is difficult. Productivity relative to worker hours is difficult
to determine, making the adjustment of production method difficult to
ascertain, even if substitution were feasible. Demand for services has
been assumed to be relatively fixed or upwards rising, and because the
decision for service output is political, management response to this
demand has led to stable or increasing employment. Up until recent
experience, the demand for public employees, particularly those in public
protection, has been assumed to be inelastic, rendering the impact of
wage and cost increases ineffective in employment level determination. 1 9
(Current experience, which has questioned this inelasticity of demand,
still indicates that the trade-off between wage and employment is not
smooth, due to the political, not economic base of decision making.)
The economic context under which public employees operate is thus
considerably different from that in the private sector; it is not irrele-
vant however. A government is obviously limited in its ability or
willingness to increase taxes infinitely. As Wellington and Winter
comment, there is no reason to suppose that it is desirable for a
governmental entity to liquidate its taxing power (to tax up to the
point where another tax increase will produce less revenue because of
the number of people it drives out of the community). The costs to
the public and state are too high, and as the authors point out, legal
1 9 Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter, Jr., are a main source of such
discussion, "The Limits Of Collective Bargaining In Public Employment,"
in Lewin, et al., Public Sector Labor Relations, Glen Ridge, NJ:
Thomas Horton & Daughters, 1977.
and moral conditions prevail to constrain taxes. The boundaries of
the constraint are not clear, however, certainly not relative to those
which arise under strict profit maximization criteria.
The nature of government as employer and provider of essential
public services thus places the determination of wages and employment
more critically in the political context. The implication for labor
relations of such placement is a number of characteristics of bargaining
unique to public employee unions. Of particular importance are the
increased role of the legal structures and the structure of employer
decision-making as a political process, rather than a single rational
actor. The greater reliance on legal and statutory mechanisms has been
justified by the nature of public sector collective bargaining as
"illegal delegation of authority" in the recognition by the sovereign
employer of the right of workers to organize and jointly determine
employment conditions -- the less elastic demand schedule, and the
essentiality of certain services to the public and the state. The
prohibition against strikes or lock outs is the major such constraint,
particularly justified in redressing an imbalance in power due to the
inelastic demand for public services and the intolerance of the public
for withdrawal of essential services. 2 0 It can also be said that
strikes are a critical threat to social peace and to the elected official.
The law has also been utilized to constrain the demands as well as the
strategies of unions, justified in the role of government as serving
2 0 Wellington and Winter, "The Limits Of Collective Bargaining In Public
Employment."
the public interest. 2 1 The scope of bargaining has thus been a more
critical issue in public sector labor relations, with greater attempts
to maintain a distinction between management and worker rights.
The structure of the bargaining relationship is more expansive
in the greater number of actors involved. A number of theorists have
recognized the existence of multi-lateral bargaining, in contrast to
the usually bilateral structure in the private sector, meaning that
influence on the negotiators may arise from actors outside the direct
bargaining setting.2 2 This may occur from union action, in seeking
out the aid of other governmental bodies or political interests, or
may rise from particular community interest groups attempting to inter-
vene on a particular issue. The nature of government is also such that
the employer is difficult to define. Policy formulation is not generated
by a single set of actors but rather in layers of hierarchial and
lateral control. Essentially, public employees must operate in an
environment of competition with other interest groups for a share of a
somewhat limited revenue pool. Support of the general public and
specific political actors and the overall political environment and its
tolerance for unionization and its strategies are thus more critical.
As Kochan has said, these factors render the balance of power far more
indeterminate in the public sector.
There are other differences between public and private employment
beyond the political and economic context, including those in the
2 1 Weitzman, The Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector.
2 21n particular, Thomas Kochan, "A Theory of Multilateral Collective
Bargaining In City Governments," in Lewin, et al., Public Sector
Labor Relations, Glen Ridge, NJ: Thomas Horton & Daughters, 1977.
technical context, the structure of bargaining, and the motivations of
the actors. The first -- the technical context or the structure of
work and its workplace -- has not received much (sufficient) attention
in industrial relations literature. It is only by going outside the
field that illumination on the work situation has been gained, which
perhaps explains part of the failure of the field to fully predict
behavior of public employees. Provision of services entails different
working conditions than those experienced in the production of commodities.
The public employee generally works among people, not machines, and the
relationship with the consumer is much more direct.23 It should be
noted, however, that more attention has been paid to this issue in
attempts to explain the limits of unionization in the public sector,
though the theories were abandoned when the prediction of lack of
unionization was confronted with massive "rebellion" in the 1960's.
Decentralization, in both management and union organization, is also
identified as peculiarly distinct characteristic of public sector labor
relations. Municipal revenues are primarily gathered from the local
property tax, providing local autonomy. Unions, particularly non-
laborers, also tend to have greater autonomy, even when affiliated
with state or national organizations. There is some evidence, however,
that as with increasing state and federal aid to localities, and
interference in local operations, unions are forming stronger statewide
2 3Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy, New York: Russel Sage,
1980, has identified a number of critical factors of the work and
workplace of some public employees which explain not only worker
attitudes, but problems with the implementation of public programs.
or national organizations.24 Lobbying of the legislature has become
one purpose of such organizations, not only for more favorable legis-
lation but also for increased funding to localities.
It has also been suggested that the motivations of actors differ
from those in the private sector. Profit maximization is not (cannot
be) the goal of management, and as was suggested in the discussion on
purposes of government, the desire to be re-elected and maintain peace
would tend to outweigh efficiency considerations. This factor has
important implications for both the growth in public employment and the
increases in wages; it has often been easier for management to maintain
social peace and gain political advantage and votes by settling with
unions without undue trouble.
Similarly, public employees have at times been endowed with
particular interests and motivations for their work. Much was written
prior to public employee unionization concerning the conflict between
public employment as a job and as a public service. "The prestige of
public employmentn25 was presumed to endow work for the government with
special rewards, apart from financial renumeration. Citizens (and
academics) expected the public spirit to motivate the worker to serve
the "public interest," implying a distinction with the worker's interests.
The advent of unionization may alter the relevancy of much of this
literature, but a variation in concept of work is still to be seen.
The research on police and fire employees and unions points to
2 4 Thomas Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, Homewood,
TL: Richard D. Irwin, 1980.
25
Harvey Mansfield, "The Prestige Of Public Employment," in Lawrence
Chickering, ed., Public Employee Unions, CA: Institute for Contem-
porary Studies, 1976.
heightened distinctions with private sector labor relations. For
one, fire and police protection are presumed to be some of the more
essential services, thus having even greater demand inelasticities.
Private sector substitution (contracting out) are also less likely for
police and fire than for other services, not only due to the difficul-
ties of training and organization, but because of perceived desire that
these services be community based. Thus demand for police and fire
personnel is presumed to be even more inelastic than in other sectors.
(Indeed, other factors such as the setting of fire insurance rates for a
municipality by number of firefighters reinforces the stability of
employment.) A greater intolerance for strikes by either service
union has also led to greater legal and statutory control, and has
affected the political pressure access of the unions. Both police and
fire unions, though more pronounced in the former, have a history of
local autonomy, whether or not they are affiliated with either a state-
wide organization or an international. The firefighter union history
does diverge from police in several key respects; its organization began
in 1890 with the creation of the International Association of Firefighters,
which 90 percent of all locals are affiliated with currently, and the
union movement has faced much less resistance than in the case of police.
The police do not have an equivalently strong international (indeed the
International Brotherhood of Police has yet to be admitted to the AFL-CIO),
2 6Among the more important works used in the discussion are, Orly Aschen-
felter, "The Effect Of Unionization On Wages In The Public Sector,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review (January 1971) and with Ehren-
berg, "The Demand For Labor In The Public Sector," in Lewin, et al.,
Public Sector Labor Relations; Robert Foegelson, Big-City Police;
Hervey Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism, Lexington, MA: Heath
& Co., 1973; and Margaret Levi, Bureaucratic Insurgency, Lexington, MA:
Heath & Co., 1977.
nor are they as organized on the state level as the firefighters.
Public resistance to police unionization was enlarged due to the characteris-
tic of police as maintainers .
The above discussion attempted to highlight the differences between
private sector and public sector labor relations which were relevant
to the formulation of union objectives and the determination of power.
The discussion was not intended to remove the public sector union out
of the general characteristics of the labor movement; the fundamentals
of workers joining together to wield power through collectivity over
their employers in order to better their working conditions is not
altered. What betterment is and how it is to be achieved may, however,
vary, though it is the hypothesis here that there is more similarity
at least in objectives than difference.
It has been seen that a critical aspect of the economic environment
facing the industrial union is not necessarily present in the public
sector -- the market competition forces creatinga trade-off situation
between higher wages and employment levels. Prior to 1975, research on
the objectives and power of the public sector union assumed the absence
of this trade-off.2 7 Formulation of union policy did not have to have
corporate consideration of such a trade-off as job security was presumed
to exist. It was also presumed that the desirability of public employment
was its security, and whatever other public spirit awards might be
derived, and that therefore the interests of the membership were
2 7Wellington and Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in the Public
Sector," in Lewin, et al., Public Sector Labor Relations.
primarily in job security. In the words of a British trade union leader,
"The civil servant lives in a state of abiding poverty, but thank god
it's permanent."28  The coming of unionization was therefore declared
a strive for "more" in terms of economic rewards, without the spectre
of unemployment. It should be noted that an important factor operating
in favor of job security was the institution of Civil Service, adopted
in many states in the early 1930's as part of a reform movement. The
drive behind Civil Service was as much an attempt to "clean-up" public
employment and insulate it from political patronage and corruption,
but it has servedasamajor device in protecting the hiring, firing, and
promotion of public workers.2 9
The consensus among authors describing union objectives indicates
that priorities were (1) recognition and the right to bargain, the primary
goal during the great expansion of public sector unionization in the
1960's, (2) higher wages, and (3) of almost equal importance, shorter
working hours and better benefits, pensions and formalized procedures
governing the work place (it might be noted that pensions are a form of
security, just obtained after retirement). Formal statements by union
leaders, supported by several academics, maintain thatthe public worker
wants what the private worker has always wanted.3 0 A number of factors
which affect the level of wage and benefit demand might be noted however.
2 8As quoted in Sterling Spero and Johan Capozzola, The Urban Community
and its Unionized Bureaucracies, New York: Dunellen, 1973.
2 9Robert Fogelson, Big-City Police.
3 0Ralph Flynn, among others, discussed the "inaccurate portrayal" of
the public employee in Public Work, Public Workers, Washington, D.C.:
New Republic Book Co., 1975.
One such which may mitigate a high demand is the localized nature of
union (and management) jurisdiction which effectively removes union
leaders from the pressures of "orbits of coercive comparison" except
within the municipality. Parity among unions in the same area, was,
however, critical and in fact has been lobbied into legislation in
numerous cities. Another mitigating factor on the size of demand of the
lack of rival unions, particularly in non-laborer unions, a union leader
is not "forced" into demanding and gaining more if competition is not
evident (internal competition for leadership may change the situation,
however). 31
Working in a potentially opposite direction is critical comparison
with private sector wage and benefits gains. Indeed, the first generation
of public sector union goal formulation is often attributed to catching
up, not only with inflation but with the private sector. 3 2 Comparability
has been institutionalized at the federal level, and in some other levels
of government, partially as a means of maintaining a fair wage in
absence of market forces, and also to keep government employment competi-
tive with private. As some have indicated, there are problems with the
prevailing wage concept as a wage determinate, particularly in defining
whose wage as relevant.3 3
3 1Ross and Dunlop both mentioned the critical role that rival unions
play in pressuring the demands of leadership.
3 2Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations.
3 31n particular, Walter Fogel and David Lewin, "Wage Determination
in the Public Sector," in Lewin, et al. Public Sector Labor Relations.
The contextual and organizational factors similarly affect the
balance of power between government and union. The traditional source
of power attributed to unions lies in the demand elasticity for the
services and employees. Some debate has occurred recently, however,
challenging the assumption that demand was inelastic. Lewin points out
that it is relatively inelastic, not absolutely, and varies with the
sector.34 The assumption of inelasticity was what drove Wellington
and Winter to perceive the unions as having greater power than manage-
ment (and thus permitting substantial blame on unions for the demise of
the fiscal stability of major cities). As mentioned previously, the
justification of the prohibition of strikes was largely based in the
attempt to re-balance power towards management. A comment can be made
on Lewin's findings. For one, elasticity in demand has been found for
teachers, more than for other public workers. The demand for police
and fire is less likely to fluctuate, not only because they provide
essential services for public safety, but also because the level of
their service is often judged by the number of visible personnel. This
relates to the fact that the inability to determine productivity pro-
vides considerable leverage for public employees. Even with the creation
of standards, the public perception of service level may still depend
on visibility of employees.
34David Lewin, "Public Sector Labor Relations, A Review Essay," in
Lewin, et al., Public Sector Labor Relations.
As others have pointed out, there are also other reasons for
public employment beyond citizen demand. The politician may still
perceive a need for more employment both to gain support from workers,
but also to have access to a pool of "campaign workers." The interests
of the state may also require that certain services be maintained
against public whim for the long term maintenance of social peace.
As public sector labor relations are primarily political, access
to the political process is a key determinate of union power. The
union must lobby with competing interest for shares of municipal
resources. The economic conditions of the community are also critical;
if revenues can be increased, the politics of distribution rather than
redistribution ease the strife of the union , as it is easier to gain
when there is not a direct loss to another. Gaining the support of the
public, and of subgroups within, is an obvious means of achieving a
more dominant position in the political arena. Special interests, or
general interest in quality of service, may be utilized in forming
alliances. As Wellington offered in example, limits in class size is
both of concern to a teachers' union and to those believing in its
relationship to quality of education. Power of the union per se may
not be critical to achievement of union goals, particularly in regards
to non-monetary gains. Skillful utilization (or creation) of a multi-
lateral collective bargaining situation affords a different degree of
influence than a union confronting a single employer.
The political context of the community (within the larger political
structure) and its tolerance for private sector unionization has been
indicated as one determinate of power -- the greater the strength of
the industrial unions, the greater that of the public sector. 3 5
More specifically, the tolerance of the local government for public
employee unionization may depend upon other factors. Organization of the
work force may serve the purposes of local politicians, either in
political support, or as a means of controlling behavior. The tolerance
of the public and the state for disruption of services is also a critical
determinate of union power, from all perspectives. Disruptions of
municipal peace threaten the status of the public official, both as an
individual in search of political power as a representative of the
state. Power of the union can therefore reflect on the willingness of
the membership to strike or assert other pressure.
Other variables affecting union power include the legal and statu-
tory structures. Basically created to maintain labor relations peace,
the direction in which power is distributed will depend on the broader
political context. Lobbying efforts by the unions, both for legislation
and for electing favorable public officials may increase, somewhat,
the favorableness of the bodies. Other determinates of power that rule
in the private sector are also applicable, such as the skill and experience
in negotiation, and the cohesiveness of the membership and work group.
The latter has been offered as a particular source of power for police
and fire, enjoyed due to the nature of work and socialization process.
3 5Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations.
In sum, there are key differences in private and public sector
labor relations which are relevant to the existence and recognition of
a trade-off between wages and employment. It has been seen that two
primary factors -- the economic context and the motivations of management --
are substantially different, putting the determination of wages and
employment outside market forces and within a political arena where
influence is gained through means other than competitive status.
Unemployment in the public sector as a response to wage increases has
not occurred, at least in the history of most public employee unions.
If anything, employment has risen with increasing wages, as a result of
a number of institutional factors. Other mechanisms have arisen to control
and limit public sector unions, in attempts to contain disruption of
municipal peace, to limit intrusions into the sovereign rights of the
employer, to remove considerable wage leverage of the unions over
management. These have served to lessen the unions' power, as have
other factors from which the union derives political resources.
In response to their environment, public employee unions have not
incorporated the concept of wage action impacts on employment, and thus
not a trade-off. Employment security has been assumed, and the driving
motivation for union action has been in pursuit of better economic
conditions. Constraints on the level of demand have been made by the
internal union dynamics and its relations with the employer and clients,
and ultimately, in the distribution of power in the political arena.
Ultimately, however, a public sector union is a union in the most funda-
mental sense - the distinction between employer and employee in control -
and public sector labor relations cannot be removed too far from its
parent.
Public Sector Labor Unions Under Fiscal Constraint
The expansion of unionization in the public sector, and the
accompanying academic literature, occurred during the 1960's, a decade
of a growing national economy and municipal coffers.36 Demands for
higher wages were made by public employees and met to a large extent
by their employers. The increased labor costs were covered for the
most part not through reallocation of revenues, but through an expansion
in total resources, i.e., increased taxation. The unions achieved their
economic gains through the politics of distribution.37 Demand for
services and for the employees to provide them was up, and was inter-
preted as inelastic. At the same time, the economic well being of the
general public was higher (as was inflation). Private sector wages
were increasing and there was some legitimization for the monetary
demands of public workers to keep pace.
By 1975, the economic context of at least the largest municipal
governments had undergone considerable change. The recession of the
early 197 0's had affected the cities as it had the nation, but the former
3 6Between 1956 and 1976, the percentage of all government employees
who were union members grew from 12.6 percent to 20.1 percent and to
39.2 percent if these parts of a bargaining organization are included.
(This is in contrast to a decline in the private sector.) Kochan,
Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, 1980. In Massachusetts,
the number of locals representing state and municipal employees grew
from 203 in 1965 to 975 in 1980 with a parallel growth in membership
from 53,600 to 177,200 (Massachusetts Department of Labor & Industries,
1980).
3 7 Numerous authors have so indicated, including Raymond Horton, "Econo-
mics, Politics, and Collective Bargaining," in Chickering, ed., Public
Employee Unions, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1976, and
Thomas Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations. Another
aspect of municipal finances is also important, the redistribution of
costs (pensions) from the current generation to the next. This permitted
an increase in union benefits without immediate growth in the budget.
did not necessarily recover. Social -- particularly demographic --
economic and political trends that had begun at an earlier time had
caught up, and fiscal stability, much less growth, could no longer be
taken for granted. The change in economic conditions was not limited
to the largest cities, though there a crisis was most clear cut. By
the end of the 1970's, another phenomenon had arisen -- the tax limitation
bill. Both conditions, the communities' inability to pay and the
communities' unwillingness to pay, severely impact the revenue sources
of a local government and therefore the context of labor relations.
The difference between the two conditions, one imposed unintentionally,
the other by firm conviction, will be discussed at a later point.
Research on public sector unions began primarily during the "first
generation" of unions. Economic constraint was not a critical point
for discussion. Indeed, the courts had supported the academics
acceptance of unconstrained funding of public employment. In Detroit,
Rochester, New York, West Haven, Connecticut, and New Bedford, Massachu-
setts, the courts had ruled that a city's claim of inability to pay
was not sufficient cause for limiting wage increases. Employees and
the client of their services should not be forced to bear the burden of
what was essentially a "political problem." Lack of funds was a
'self-imposed inability"; cities could and would raise sufficient funds
to provide fair wages for their employees. 3 8
3 8 Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community And Its Unionized Bureaucracies.
The discussion of union objectives and strengths had been couched
in terms of an assumed security of employment. The trade-off between
employment and wages which had been the starting point for discussion
of union objectives in the private sector had not been examined in
depth, and prediction of union behavior under newly imposed economic
constraints was rarely attempted. In general, sufficient time has
not elapsed for accurate modeling to be developed. Even those who
examined closely the crisis in New York City and explained union behavior
after the fact, are waiting a longer time before attempting prediction
of future events.
By 1975, it was no longer possible to talk about assured job
security much less continued gains by unions in both membership and
benefits in the public sector. In New York City, the most dramatic
case of fiscal crisis, 60,000 public sector jobs were lost between 1976
and 1978.39 With limited revenues, gains in wages could not be filled
through expansion, but required a reallocation of resources, either
from other expenditure areas or from other employees. The large ratio
of personnel to other costs, even higher relative to non-fixed costs,
mandated that reallocation among expenditure area was limited. Under
considerable distress, personnel reductions could not be avoided. What
emerged was the existence of a trade-off between wage increases and
employment in the public sector.
There are different views on the impact of municipal fiscal con-
straint on public sector labor relations. To some, the fiscal crisis
3 9 Joan Weitzman, City Workers And Fiscal Crisis, Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers,
1979.
has signalled a transplant of the aberrant public sector labor relations
structure back into the more general context of the competitive private
sector structure.40 In this view, the monopoly of the public employee
(and of the public official over service levels) has been undermined
sufficiently that the special status accorded public sector labor
relations, particularly the limits on striking, is no longer justified.
(The advocacy of removal of no-strike laws comes largely out of a belief
that (a) public employee strikes are not as costly to the public as
once perceived, and (b) the strike alternatives created were biased,
and only by reimposing this constraint, will an equitable balance
result.) From this perspective, as public employees unions face the
same economic constraints as in the competitive sector, the same
variables affecting goals and power determination of private sector
unions would pertain to public as well.
Others have perceived fiscal constraint as fundamentally altering
the conditions under which collective bargaining took place but not to
the extent that the market as determinate of wage and employment levels
41has pre-empted the political process of governmental decision-making.
What has been perceived is a change in the structure and motivation of
management, which in combination with the limits to fiscal expansion,
has altered the power balance between management and employee. The
public recognition of scarce resources would make it easier for the
public official to reconcile managerial versus political goals, with
4 David Lewin, "Collective Bargaining And The Right To Strike," in
Chickering, ed., Public Employee Unions.
4 1 David Horton, "Economics, Politics, and Collective Bargaining," in
Chickering, ed., Public Employee Unions, has identified a number
of such effects.
the assumption that service level decisions might more readily affect
considerations of productivity and need assessment than political
pressure. In many of the most dramatic cases of fiscal crisis, the
actors involved have expanded to include state and federal officials,
as well as private, particularly bankers involved within the municipal
bond market. It has been hypothesized that such interference from
actors further removed from the local situation would weaken the union
position as the desire for cooperative relations between city and union
would not be of paramount importance to distant organizations, nor would
the relations developed to maintain municipal peace be undisturbed.
The more the belief in a mutual benefit for management and employees
derived from generous settlements, the more profound a change in manage-
ment structure would be perceived.
The political context of bargaining is theorized to change, as
well as management motivation, under fiscal constraint. Where unions
once made gains by increasing their share of an enlarging pie, under a
limited revenue base, further gains are made at the expense of others, thus
the theory that fiscal constraint alters the political environment from
one of allocation to reallocation of resources. The union is therefore
placed on the defensive and in competition with other interests. The
distinction between public support for services versus employees (i.e.,
their benefit levels) is sharpened; questions of accountability and
efficiency become of greater concern. If anything, access to political
resources becomes more critical, for unions, at a time when traditional
resources may be in jeopardy, such as public support and cordial rela-
tions with management. With a fixed budget, costs have to be contained
within. The result for employees is a choice between higher wages and
fewer employees or vice versa. Either way the multiplication has to
come out the same.
In this perspective, however, the peculiarities of government as
employer and service provider remain. The demand for public labor might
be shown to be less than totally inelastic, but a trade-off between
employment and wages is still not a smooth curve. A reduction in employ-
ment occurs out of crisis, not from general economic flows. Due to the
nature of service provision, personnel reductions are overly visible
to the public eye and still face extreme difficulties in productivity/
efficiency determination. The union can still try to influence the
proportion of its budget to total revenue. The variables which play such
a critical role in determination of union power and the "predictability"
of a wage/employment trade-off are not reinstituted.
If a trade-off between wages and employment is now presumed to
exist, the literature of industrial and public labor relations does
offer some help in understanding and perhaps predicting union reaction.
Insofar as private and public environmental contexts, actors, and rela-
tionships, share a similar system, the work of Dunlop, Ross, and others
can be utilized. In the critical differences, the public literature
particular to public sector relations does offer some insights. What is
sought is a framework for predicting and explaining the outcome of a
trade-off between wages and employment, with the underlying assumption
(and hope) that the decision would reflect in part the objectives of a
union recognizing that these may be influenced by the particular power
balance in existence at the critical moment and that the "union" is
not a single entity but an organization.
Any purely economic considerations would be influenced by the
perception and not necessarily the reality (a phenomenon not sufficiently
appreciated in the private sector wage determination literature) of the
nature of the economic constraint and its direct impact on the defined
bargaining unit. Not only is the belief important but also the degree
of uncertainty perceived. It might be suggested that in the immediate
instance, when a union is confronted with a total budget for its
membership, uncertainty would not rule and the direct relationship
between wages and employment would be visible; however, this situation
would be an artificial, not market, creation and not approximate with
the competitive, long-term conditions which are the heart of models
such as Dunlop's. If a union were to perceive a fundamental shift in
the fiscal properties of local government, the concept of trade-offs
between employment and wage increases would be evident, but impossible
to predict. It is the belief here that fiscal constraint has not
sufficiently altered the political nature of the budget process to
render market-position considerations pertinent. The boundaries of
the trade-off remain blurred and susceptible to the political, not
economic, power of a union.
As Ross suggested, wage bill maximization or other economic cal-
culations of membership income cannot be and therefore are not the key
to understanding a union's behavior in general; in the public sector,
where market forces are even further removed, they offer even less in
predicting union reaction to trade-offs imposed under fiscal constraint.
Instead, Ross offers the concept of a union as a separate entity from
its membership, an organization with an interest of its own, and that
interest being its own preservation. In this light, in order to
understand union reaction, one has to approach the internal dynamics
of union organization, its power structures between leader and member-
ship, union and larger organizations, and union and management. The
union leader is assumed to act in the interest of preserving the union
entity (though others have suggested that this may not always be the
case and may fluctuate with human nature). Preservation of the union
can be extrapolated to mean preventing loss of power against management,
competing unions, and loss of membership to a magnitude threatening
survival. In order to predict reaction to constraints, the way in
which the union was threatened would have to be determined. A bit of
extrapolation from Ross's model also indicates that the location of
power, and where it is potentially threatened, affects the outcome.
Under this model, the decision between wages and employment is
essentially made by the union leader, who responds to the various
pressures arising from the membership, the larger organization, and
management, and it might be added, weighs the affect of either
alternative on the power of the union. Loss of membership through
unemployment is weighed against loss of allegiance of the membership;
the magnitude of unemployment, cohesiveness and strength of member-
ships' definition of union "delivery" (what it is and how much of it
must be gained by the leader to maintain its hold over the membership),
and the strength which is afforded by the size and cohesiveness of the
membership in other union relationships would all affect the outcome;
in other words, the determination of Shister's critical point whereby
unions will make cost concessions. Affiliation with a larger organiza-
tion might have influence on the decision, the degree of which depending
on the degree of centralization (how much power is derived from the
relationship being important in the consideration of such influence)
and the strength of the position taken by the larger unit.
To Ross, the maintenance of friendly relations with management was
also a critical concern, with an underlying assumption in his work that
the mature union will recognize the value of such cooperation and work
to maintain it. A wage reduction would presumably be taken, not to
preserve employment, but to buy union security. The desirability of
the friendly relationship with management is not adequately outlined by
Ross, however, at least in this author's opinion. It might be predicted
that cooperation is sought when other power resources are not available
by the union, rather than when a state of maturity has been reached.
Changes in management organization and motivation may alter the quality
of relations without reference to union action, particularly due to the
political role of the employer and the effects of fiscal constraint on
management flexibility. If management perceives the situation as one
enabling greater managerial, rather than political, control, the main-
tenance of friendly relations may require substantial concession by the
union. Certainly the quality of relations between unions and management
will suffer consequences of fiscal constraint. In sum, it is predicted
that the outcome of a trade-off will depend on which alternative threatens
the security of the union, both internally and externally, the least.
As was mentioned in the framework for labor relations in the private
sector, union power sources were not only utilized to obtain objectives,
but influenced those objectives themselves. Margaret Levi, in analysis
of police unions, determined the same relationship between power and
goals in the public sector.43 She postulated that the goals of unions
at the beginning are gaining recognition and the right to bargain.
After this initial objective has been won, objectives can proceed to
other priorities, such as wage gains or limiting management's ability
to move personnel about within the work place. (Some have surmised
that after these objectives have been fulfilled to a satisfactory level,
others such as control over the work place or attention to the quality
of work itself may become important.) Ross' institutional theory of
the union, and the desire of the leadership to maintain its own power
43Levi, Bureaucratic Insurgency
4 4 Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, mentions
such, as do many others concerned with the quality of work.
as well as the survival of the organization, heightens the importance
of power to goal formulation (leaders will seek what can be achieved
in order to save face). In this light, the outcome of an imposed trade-
off may depend on whether a union's access to power is through different
channels which could achieve different outcomes. In other words, it
is possible that if a union can preserve its employment rather than
wages, that option may be taken and assumed to be an objective.
What the public sector labor relations literature has added to
prediction is a more detailed list of a union's power resources.
Because the locus of collective bargaining is in the political process,
rather than economic, power resources have a broader range. It can be
predicted that included in the list of power resources in question
will be the legal and statutory apparatus governing labor relations
and public employment in general, the media and public support, and
special political influence through an interest group of specific
political actor or body, utilized particularly through pressures to
create a multilateral bargaining system. Of greatest importance, however,
may be the ability and the willingness of the union to severely disrupt
services and municipal peace. Such ability is obviously related to
public priorities among services and tolerance of their disruption; the
willingness of a union is less easily discerned arising not only out
of the degree of tolerance by the ruling powers in the community and the
expected effect (particularly in the ability of the management to
provide what is demanded), but also through relationships and conditions
within the union and its workplace. Other resources of influence would
include those applicable to the private sector, particularly the
competency of negotiators and relationships with affiliated organizations.
It should be noted that public sector labor relations literature arose
out of a time period when trade-offs were not relevant, and the critical
sources and magnitudes of power were not necessarily defined so as to
determine outcome under fiscal constraint.
The peculiarities of the public sector labor relations system leads
to a possible alternative to all of the above; unions may use their
power to prevent the generation of a trade-off at all, at least in the
short run. Lobbying of the state legislature for more aid to munici-
palities is one such strategy, essentially desiring that politics of
distribution be returned to the local level, and only at the state
level would redistributive politics reign. Injunction against layoffs
obtained from the courts, if successful, would similarly remove the
imposition of a trade-off, but be more likely to merely postpone its
arrival.
More fundamental, and based more clearly in the theory of collective
bargaining, is the potential for the scope of bargaining to evolve.
Walton and others have perceived the negotiation process as not necessarily
conflictual. 4 5 Walton identified four components to the negotiation
process: distributive, the classic resolution of conflict; integrative,
4 5Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor
Negotiations, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.
where objectives are not in conflict; attitudinal, where the quality
of the relationship between management and labor is affected, and
intraorganizational, the negotiation that occurs within union and
management structures. It is in the second, integrative bargaining,
that some hope has been expressed for the generation of alternatives
which eliminate the necessity of trade-offs, at least in employment
and wages. The proposal for joint labor management committies or other
such joint efforts at problem resolution, is an extension of this idea.
One of the major issues that has been the focus of such proposals is
an increase in (and definition of) productivity.
Broadening the scope of bargaining, however, is not necessarily
easy or desirable. Much concern has put in the past on clearly defining
the scope in public sector labor relations, primarily due to the problems
of "illegal delegation of authority" in government admitting a special
interest group. Because management serves the public, justification
for preserving management prerogative has been accepted fairly consistently
in the past. Where the line is drawn between union cooperation in
generating alternatives and union interference has been an issue frequently
resolvable only in court. The union may also perceive that entrance
into this arena does not, or should not, serve its interest. As
numerous union leaders have said, it is their problem how to find the
money. Whether alternatives to the trade-off can be generated through
this mechanism, may largely depend on how the quality of relationship
between labor and management evolves, or is desired to evolve.
Certainly the literature indicates that a prediction of outcome
of a choice between employment and wages cannot be made as a generalized
principle. The determining variables are to be found in the reality
and perception of the economic context, the political and public policy
context, which despite a state legal structure, varies not only by town
but for each type of union, and within the motivations and resource
access of unions and management, which it is maintained are not set by
generalized model but by the internal and external organization and
relationships of the various actors. What is perhaps missing from the
literature of collective bargaining and labor relations is analysis of
the most basic element of the system, the relationship of the worker
to his/her work and to the workplace. Though the technological component
in the labor relationship was an integral part of some of the earlier
writings (and certainly those of Marx and his successors), the "meaning
of work" and therefore of the union has largely been ignored.
That the union has to "deliver" to maintain allegiance is fairly
clear, but what "delivery" means is not well illuminated, particularly
in a context such as immediate fiscal cutback. Higher wages and fringes
has been the traditional call attached to the unionized worker, implying
that work is not much more than income. This definition has been under
increasing attack from many directions, including unions and political
conservatives. Indeed, a study of worker attitudes in 1973 (commissioned
under the conservative Nixon administration) concluded that work meant
much more than income to the majority of American workers. 46 The
4 6Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Work
In America, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1973.
implication is that unions and management must come to expand the scope
of the issues over which they negotiate. It also implies that trade-
offs may not be perceived by the membership between employment and wages,
but employment and other issues concerning work. In essence, this is
as much a challenge to the theory of trade-offs as Ross to Dunlop, in
perceiving union leadership to operating under a trade-off between union
survival and power versus wages, not employment and wages.
What alternative concept of work means for the union, its goals
and power, has not been studied since the advent of public sector
unionization overturned the seemingly mistaken view that "public spirit"
motivated the worker. That issue or others of similar nature has not
been re-examined by the body of the labor relations field. It is postulated
here that the meaning of work and union is far from irrelevant in its
influence on membership objectives.
The Origins Of The Fiscal Constraint And Its Effect On Public Sector
Labor Relations
It was mentioned at the outset of the preceding section that there
are essentially two distinct conditions which impose radical constraints
on public employment -- a community's inability to pay, such as in the
New York City crisis, and a community's unwillingness to pay, such as
in the tax limitation bill. Though the underlying and indirect causes
may be similar, there is a qualitative difference in tone between the
two which has import for the environment under which public sector
labor relations are conducted.
It is at first relevant to recognize a few of the possible causes
of unintentional fiscal constraint. Numerous authors have blamed the
public employee unions for driving major cities such as Cleveland and
New York to bankruptcy. Though other causes are as, if not more, rele-
vant (particularly such non-economic influences as political pressuring
for control by private business, general demographic trends, and poor
management), the nature of public employment, and thus their repre-
sentatives, may have impacts leading to fiscal crisis.
That market forces do not determine wages directly in the public
sector was indicated previously. The alternative ways in which they
may be determined, both under unionism and not, have significant con-
sequences. Several theories relate urban fiscal crisis to lower
productivity in the public employment (the nature of services render
it difficult to determine productivity or efficiency, and it is generally
presumed to be significantly lower). One theorist maintains that
wage rates in the low-productivity sector fluctuate with the technolo-
gically advanced sector. If the two are kept in balance and output
increases, municipal government will experience rising employment and
costs per employee; this with other factors will mean an unlimited rise
in the cost of local government. The use of a "prevailing wage rate"
in setting public employment wages might have such an effect. O'Connors
has also argued that as the rationale for public employment must come
out of social or political reasons, productivity cannot be a considera-
tion in employment or wages. He views an increase in employment as
arising out of pressures for services to reproduce capitalism. Those
theorists that argue that management has electoral motives in increasing
employment, perceive that, in opposition to what occurs under market
forces, increase in price (wage) results in an increase in employment
(the political clientele group is reduced if higher wages are accompanied
by layoffs).48 Unions play a role in these factors, by increasing the
pressure of management (and the state) to deliver higher wages in order
to prevent disruption of a political environment. They also serve to
institutionalize such things as comparable wages, and provide an organi-
zation for effective transference of demands. As Wellington and Winter
have perceived, any inelasticity in demand for services enables unions
to have greater power and increase wages without an equivalent balance
in lower employment. The costs of government rise, management is under
4 7William Baumol, "Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Autonomy
of Urban Crisis," American Economic Review (June 1967).
4 8Daniel Orr, "Public Employee Compensation Levels," in Chickering,
ed., Public Employee Unions.
pressure to continue providing services and employment, and frequently
seeks ways of postponing payment (such as debt financing) as well as
raising taxes. The result of the latter is the eventual threat of
default.
Support for the property tax limitation bill may arise from the
pressure of rising governmental costs in increasing citizens' tax
burdens. It may also arise from perceived lack of productivity,
perhaps inspired by the fact that the services provided do not reflect
the full value of the worker because of time spent gathering votes, or
for other reasons based in the technical context, as Katz has suggested,
whereby larger bureaucracies have necessitated an increase in clerical
and white collar workers who are not visible to the public yet increase
the wage bill. 49 The imposed limitation on government spending may
imply a "backlash" whereby citizens resent the "arrogance" and size
of government and the intrusion on their social and political lives as
well as economic welfare.5 0 Or it may be a response to the nature of
the tax system, particularly in the property tax burden.51
The fundamental problem with a tax limitation initiative is that
the statement which the public is making is unclear, and thus leaves
management and employees in a position of uncertainty. The advent of
such initiatives in a number of states, particularly California, has
inspired considerable conjecture on the reasons the public supported
4 9Harry Katz, "The Municipal Budgetary Response To Changing Labor Costs,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review (July 1979).
5 0As Senator Jarvis has been known to say.
5 1Frank Levy, "On Understanding Proposition 13," Public Interest (1979)
and Robert Kuttner, Revolt Of The Eaves, New York: Simon & Schuster,
1980, both provide primarily such an explanation for the Californian
tax limitation amendment, Proposition 13.
such bills and the implications for public policy. The indeterminateness
of the cause has been compounded by political posturing, particularly
by those who seek a reduction in all government.
The tax limitation bill which passed in Massachusetts in November,
1980, Proposition 2 , suffers from the same uncertainty of cause. The
bill limits the total property tax levy a municipal government can make.
(It also, among other provisions, eliminates binding arbitration for
police and fire disputes.)52 For some cities and towns this has meant
considerable fiscal constraint. As in other states a number of reasons
(and implications) for its passage have been given, both by "impartial"
researchers, and by actors in the political context. A survey of voters
taken at the time of the vote has recently been compiled and indicates
that the majority of voters who supported the bill (a) did not necessarily
seek a smaller government sector, (b) were somewhat dissatisfied with
the property tax burden rather than taxes in general, and, the most
consistent finding of all, (c) perceived inefficiency and corruption
in government and thus believed that a tax limit would not affect the
level of essential services. 5 3 The survey also indicated that there
was some misconception concerning the nature of the bill. The survey
has not yet been published, and even when it is, it is unclear how
these findings will alter the positions being held by various groups
5 2 Further elaboration of the provisions of Proposition 2 are made in
the first section of Chapter Two.
5 3Helen Ladd and Julie Boatright Wilson, "Proposition 2 : Explaining
the Vote," draft of monograph, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Cambridge, MA, April 1981.
at the moment. 5 4
The dominant union position denies that voters were reacting either
against public employees or against public services. The claim is (1)
that the voters did not understand the bill and its implications, and
therefore once service cuts are made, the demand will be to remove the
limitation, and (2) that there was dissatisfaction with the property
tax and the state should increase its aid to local governments (shift
the taxation system). Public officials in general have similarly
illicited an outcry and demanded help from the state legislature. Their
position has been somewhat similar to that of the unions, denying an
"affront" to local government and its workers and administrators.
Some representatives of management (and some local officials),
however, have perceived a mandate from the public to increase efficiency
and through that mandate a shift in public support from public employees
to public managers. Thus, through public pressure and the elimination
of binding arbitration, plus the recognition of fiscal constraint,
the balance of power has shifted significantly.
The ramifications for public sector labor relations are thus
slightly different from those of an unintentional fiscal crisis.
The power of unions may be similarly weakened in both cases through
the inability of the union to increase the size of the revenue pool
and thus have to compete with other unions and interests, the intro-
duction of other actors into the bargaining setting, connections such
54
The positions held which follow were gathered from local newspaper
reporting, interviews with union leaders, public officials, and
their legal representatives.
as pension fund investments in city bonds which make default far more
costly than loss of employment, and the pressures on management to
increase efficiency. The purposeful imposition of such constraints
makes the power shift more significant and of greater magnitude. Even
those who maintain that the major thrust of such initiatives is
against the property tax, rather than government, admit that some
dissatisfaction by the public with government "efficiency" is evident.
Every way in which unions were affected under general constraint
becomes more critical. The pressures for services have collided
with pressures against increased taxes, rendering the means to social
peace and policital popularity more difficult, as well as weakening
union power. In relation to the trade-off between wages and employ-
ment, an imposed constraint through public conviction thus removes
some of the institutional factors prohibiting direct links between
employment and wages. The trade-off is therefore heightened.
Union power to affect the outcome is not only weakened but
is also weakened in avoiding the imposition of such a trade-off.
It is conceivable that the legal and institutional mechanism (such
as court rulings against claims of inability to pay by governments
and vivil service restriction on layoffs) which were at times the
last recourse to preventing employment effects of wage increases
will begin to reflect the perceived public attitude and rule against
the public employee.
There is perhaps another important impact of the publicly approved
fiscal constraint, that on the attitude of the public employee. A
vote for such limitation, may be perceived as an affront to the public
worker as the provider of desired services. Even if it is believed
that the voters were in error, or sought a shift in tax system, the
fact that the public would risk impacts on public services might be
perceived as further indication that the work of the public employee
is not appreciated. Not only will this lessen the access to power
through public support, but may increase whatever doubts were remaining
that the public employee is a worker first, and public servant second.
The reasons which led to unionization in the first place may more
forcibly reassert themselves. The result may or may not be an increase
in militancy, but certainly impacts will be felt on morale and the
willingness of the public employee to "sacrifice" for the public.
CHAPTER II - THE CASE OF BELMONT
The Context - Labor Relations In Massachusetts
Full understanding of the events occuring in Belmont between town
officials and unions in the period following the passage of Proposition
2 requires recognition of the environmental context under which the
specific actors involved in the case operated. As the labor relations
literature has consistently indicated, a local labor relations system
such as in Belmont does not exist in a political or economic vacuum,
but is greatly integrated with the patterns and structures of the
state (and the nation), all of which help set the "rules" of relation-
ships among the participants. Of particular importance to an under-
standing of the case are the statewide structures of the legal and
institutional system, those of the actors and their peculiar charac-
teristics (management, unions, and the public), and the general econo-
mic environment. The effect of the legal system is the most readily
generalizable, due to its jurisdiction, and is a somewhat general
reflection of the political climate and distribution of power; therefore,
it is detailed in particular. It was also to play an important role
in dictating the difference in choice of strategies available to the
unions examined in Belmont's case. The technical or work context is
also of relevance according to some theories of labor relations
context; however, the relevant job characteristics of the different
employee unions are quite specific and are discussed at a later point.
The Legal And Institutional System
Massachusetts was by no means unique to the expansion of public
employee unionization during the 19 60's and early 1970's. Between
1965 and 1975, the number of union locals representing state and
municipal employees grew from 203 to 751 with more than a doubling
in membership totals. The political environment was sufficiently
supportive of public sector unionization to establish in 1965 a state
statute (Chapter 149S) giving municipal employees the right to bargain
about wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment (state
employees had been given the right to'bargain with respect to work
conditions but not wages in 1964). The 1965 legislation provided for
disputes over the terms of collective bargaining to be carried out
through mediation and fact-finding, but not through arbitration or
other steps for final resolution; strikes and lockouts were prohibited.
In 1973, effective July of 1974, a new law, Chapter 150E, was
enacted, extending full bargaining rights to state and municipal em-
ployees. As defined by the law, employers were now obligated to bar-
gain with public employee unions over wages, hours, terms and condi-
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tions of work, and standards of productivity and performance.
Negotiated agreements were permitted to prevail over any conflicting
ordinance, by law, and statutory provision, a change from the 1965
legislation. Also provided by Chapter 150E was last-best offer
1
Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries, 1980.
2According to David Downs, IBPO attorney and other labor attorneys,
until recently, "standards of productivity" is frequently forgotten
and is seldom incorporated into collective bargaining. In Downs'
opinion, the attempt to productivity bargain is a "management ploy".
arbitration for police and fire employee disputes. In such binding
arbitration, the arbitrator is required to choose between the package
of final proposals made by the union and that of the town, presumably
compelling both sides to come closer to each other to prevent a true
win by the other side. Town and city managers began to perceive the
procedure as biased towards unions during the first three years of the
law, and attempted to prevent the renewal of the entire Chapter in
1977.3 After a gubernatorial veto and legislative override, Chapter
150E was renewed with binding arbitration, and prohibition of strikes
has remained intact and in force until the events of November, 1980.
The guardian of the collective bargaining law is the Massachusetts
Labor Relations Commission (MLRC), created in 1937 but endowed with
greater powers in 1974. The Commission determines appropriate bar-
gaining units and hears complaints of prohibited practice under the
law filed by either unions or management. Through such hearings, the
Commission has played a strong role not only in enforcing the rights
of public employees to organize and bargain, but has also affected the
substance of such negotiations and determined the boundaries of good
faith (and thus fulfillment of the legal obligation) bargaining.
Its powers to order relief if prohibited practice is determined include
the issuance of cease and desist orders, reinstatement with back pay,
and other compensatory awards.
3According to John Dunlop in a 1980 article in the Massachusetts
Business and Economic Report (Fall 1980).
Like all law, the collective bargaining law is dependent upon
the historic interpretation of its provisions, in this case through
that of the rulings of the Commission and the courts. The ability of
a union to control job security through negotiation has been eroded
through a number of cases during the last six years. Most important
of which is the Danvers case in 1977 which established that the
determination of level of service was a "core governmental decision
removed from terms and conditions of employment," and therefore not
a mandatory subject of bargaining (mandatory means a subject in which
formal impasse may be reached and unfair labor practice charged if
a demand to bargain is refused). In the Newton School Committee case
of 1978,5 the Commission upheld the Danvers finding but ruled that
management was obligated to bargain over how a level of service re-
duction was to be reached -- through layoffs, attrition, work sharing,
and other means -- and to bargain over the impact of the means of
reduction on the work force. As shall be seen, some ambiguity is left
between the two rulings and leaves room for divergent interpretation.
Also important is the issue of minimum manning clauses in contracts,
which has been resolved in favor of firefighters6 (minimum manning
per vehicle and shift) is a mandatory subject of bargaining, but not
for other personnel, particularly police. Minimum manning can influence
4Town of Danvers, 3 MLC 1559 (1977).
5 Newton School Committee, 5 NLC 1016 (1978).
6City of Newton, 2 MLC 1192 (H.O., 1975) and Town of Danvers, 3 MLC
1559 (1977).
the security of numbers of position, though not necessarily the parti-
cular personnel who hold them. All of the above imply that the right
of a union to demand to negotiate over various issues determining job
security is limited, and therefore that collective bargaining law
itself does not mean that issues of employment level can be insulated
from other contextual (and power) factors.
If the law under Chapter 150E enforced by the MLRC maintains
the integrity of a negotiated contract, other institutions and legal
organizations also have impact on the contents. Of predominant
importance, particularly for employment/wage trade-off constraints, is
the Civil Service Statute, Chapter 31, and its enforcer, the Civil
Service Commission. These govern the rules of personnel movement, the
hiring, promotion, transfer, discharge, and importantly, layoffs of
municipal employees. The statute has a much older history than that
of the collective bargaining, arising out of the reform movement of
the turn of the century. Towns had the option, not the obligation, to
adopt Civil Service regulation of their employees and therefore consi-
derable variance is seen among towns in employee coverage, though
police and fire personnel are commonly included under its domain.
Civil service regulation has considerable impact on job security
and therefore, where it applies to unionized employees, such provisions
governing personnel movement in, out, and within an organization, are
frequently left to commission regulation rather than contract negotia-
tion. The statute mandates that seniority, in conjunction with state
administered exams determines hiring and promotion eligibility, thus
lessening the flexibility of management to change personnel. It also
"stiffens" the means of personnel reduction. The statute not only
mandates the procedure, such as appropriate notice and a seniority
basis for order of layoffs, but also requires that, if appealed by the
employee, a municipality must demonstrate that lack of work or lack
of funds necessitates layoffs. The determination of lack of funds,
i.e., the integrity of the local budget, is not specified by the law
but is open to interpretation by the Commission. Civil service also
offers an "explicit contract" (in contrast to the theory of implicit
contracts that developed in the labor relations literature7 ) in the
granting of reinstatement rights for five years following employee
separation from his/her position. Civil Service regulation falls
short of guaranteeing full job security, but does help to insulate
employees from political and economic fluctuations.
Two other legislative bodies are worthy of mention, the Joint
Labor Management Committee For Municipal Police And Fire (or the Dunlop
Committee as it is commonly referred to due to John Dunlop's chairman-
ship and dominant role), and the State Board of Conciliation and
Arbitration. The former was created in 1978 as a compromise solution
to the conflict which had evolved between unions and town officials
over binding arbitration and the renewal of Chapter 150E. The committee,
composed of management and union representatives nominated by their
7 See for instance, Costas Azariadas, "Implicit Contracts and Under-
employment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, (1975).
respective statewide organizations. It has oversight responsibility
on all police and fire negotiations, and is able to utilize a number
of dispute resolution tools including factfinding and various forms
of final arbitration. It essentially coordinates dispute resolution
between police and fire agreements within a community and among conti-
guous localities, and introduces a "balanced" state perspective on
local collective agreements. The Committee may also refer a case to
the Board for Conciliation and Arbitration, the more traditional body
which conducts interest arbitration, both voluntary and last-best-
offer (only for police and fire unless voluntarily agreed to by both
management and unions) arbitration. Both the Committee and the Board
serve to contain conflict and thus affect the range and magnitude of
contract terms. Both also serve to introduce perspective (and compara-
bility) beyond the particular locality in which negotiation impasse
has been reached and perhaps enhances the communication of influence
and political context of a larger environment.
Other laws and policies of state, local, and federal government
also serve to affect the context of labor relations in a municipality,
but because of their less direct bearing on the case to be discussed,
and the complexity of determining impact, they are left undefined.
The importance of delineating the above institutional and legal struc-
tures was in their very immediate and direct impact on the nature of
constraints and resources available to unions in relation to management.
At the same time that the collective bargaining law protects the right
of public employees to unionize and bargain, it limits the scope of
those rights and bounds the range of negotiation. The line between
management and union rights is clarified (though perhaps open to
minor dispute) and therefore incorporated into attitudes and expecta-
tions, perhaps rendering it more difficult to challenge.
The legal and institutional structures serve a further purpose,
of major relevance to the employment/wage trade-off. It is obvious
that the provisions of the civil service statute stiffen the ability
of management to implement personnel reductions, at least in the
short run, and increase the costs. Seniority provisions likewise
affect the ability of management to freely interchange workers for
productivity considerations, as mentioned by Belfer and Bloom8 .
From the union perspective, civil service regulation provides some job
security which is outside the collective bargaining process, and thus
not directly connected to demand for other terms and conditions of
employment muddling a trade-off. The law and its interpretation,
however, serves to limit the extent to which job security issues not
covered by civil service can be incorporated into direct provisions
of the contract (whether or not traded off for wages or other benefits),
and thus introduces the potential for such an employment/wage trade-
off should other factors permit.
8Nathan Belfer and Gordon Bloom("Unionism and the Marginal Productivity
Theory" in Richard Lester and Joseph Shister, eds., Insights Into
Labor Issues, 1949) discuss such provisions in their impact on
private sector labor relations.
The Actors
Under the guide of home rule, towns and cities in Massachusetts are
permitted considerable flexibility in the determination of management
hierarchy, its power, and ultimately the distribution of power with
labor. Some of the legal and institutional structures guiding labor
relations are optional for a town or city, i.e., civil service coverage,
through others, particularly the rulings under Chapter 150E, are not
and serve to limit the flexibility of management to determine its
relationship with employees. The concept of home rule also has the
consequence of limiting the extent to which the structure of labor
relations can be generalized across the state, even beyond the variance
in local economic and political contexts. The degree of public involve-
ment, either through direct participation or indirect political pressure,
similarly varies with the particular characteristics of residents
and government structure (formal and informal).
The structure in regards to unions is also fairly decentralized
with considerable autonomy of local union units. There are approximately
165 local labor organizations representing 11,700 firefighters and
252 locals representing 12,200 police officers in the Commonwealth.
Affiliation with state and national organizations does, however, have
impact on local labor relations. There are differences in the degree
of such centralization between fire and police unions. The International
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, with its statewide organization,
the Massachusetts Professional Firefighters, represents almost all
unionized firefighter locals. Its powers at the state level are con-
siderable, due to the concentration of power in one organization and
one leader, Dusty Alward for many years, and have led to favorable
legislation and (perhaps rulings, such as the minimum manning issue).
It should be noted that though there is some influence from state to
local, the predominant role of the MPF is to lobby the state legis-
lature.
The police are less centralized, with the International Brotherhood
of Police Officers being the largest, but by no means, only state and
international affiliate. Much greater diversity exists in affiliation
of local police units, and has had some impact on the ability of the
police to successfully lobby for favorable legislation.
The Economic Context And Proposition 2
As a very general summary, the economy of Massachusetts has faired
better than much of the nation in the past few years. As a consequence,
unemployment levels have generally been lower than the national average,
though there has been considerable diversity among sectors, due to shifts
in the economic base. This has not meant, however, that real income
for Massachusetts residents has been increasing; indeed, there is some
evidence that even relative to the rest of the nation, real income
has been falling.9
9 A study led by Bennet Harrison of M.I.T., the New England Project,
completed in 1980, has shown that due to lower wage levels and
high cost of living, Massachusetts residents as a whole have lost
real income compared to the national average.
Local conditions vary considerably, as is the nature of micro-
level economics. It can be said, however, that in general, the fiscal
health of most Massachusetts towns has not been enhanced during the
last five years. Also of importance is the heavy burden of property
tax on residents, unusual relative to the nation. The current conserva-
tive nature of state government has not served to alleviate such burden.
On November 4, 1980, the future fiscal health of many towns and
cities of the state was substantially affected. Proposition 2
passed with a substantial majority, for a variety of possible reasons
but not the least including the heavy burden of property taxes. The
bill, a statutory provision in contrast to the constitutional amendment
passed in California under Proposition 13, limits property taxes to
2 percent of the municipality's full and fair cash value of property;
for those under the 2 percent levy, the percentage in 1979 becomes the
limit. Municipalities over the limit are required to reduce their
current levy by 15 percent per year until 2 percent is reached. The
bill also reduces the Motor Vehicle Excise rate from $66.00 to $25.00
per $1,000.00 of assessed value, a 62 percent reduction. School fiscal
autonomy was abolished, unfunded state mandates prohibited, governmental
assessments on municipalities limited, and tenants were permitted to
deduct half of their rent from taxable state income. Compulsory and
binding arbitration for police and fire personnel was repealed, a
victory after long battle for town management over unions.
The fiscal impact of the bill is considerable. Property taxes
represent on the average 60 percent of total municipal revenues
(higher in smaller towns); the excise tax a considerably smaller propor-
tion but nonetheless important. It has been estimated that for fiscal
year 1981 (the property tax provisions of the bill become effective
July 1, 1981), 153 towns and cities would be affected by the property
tax limit and lose a total of $347 million in revenues. Through the
excise tax reduction, effective January 1, 1981, and affecting all
towns and cities, the total loss through FY 82 is predicted to be
$225 million. The impact of the other provisions has yet to be de-
termined.
The Context - The Town of Belmont
As is necessary to understand the general environment of labor
relations in the state for explanation of local systems, it is also
important to appreciate the particular local structures of govern-
ment and history of labor relations as they affect a specific situa-
tion. The behavior of the police and fire unions in response to town
officials in Belmont between November, 1980, and March, 1981, arose out
of a historical as well as contemporary context. The quality of
relations between town officials and unions, and the outcome of the
power struggle which was to arise out of the passage of Proposition
2 were all tainted with the history of relations in the past, the
management structure, the union membership, and the town characteristics.
Some conditions were indeed altered under the current context, and
in their relative change had impact on union and management behavior;
however, union objectives and the factors which led to their formula-
tion were not created at the moment but reflected much deeper roots
within the town, as well as without. Therefore, prior to relating
the events of the critical time period, a background on Belmont and
the history of labor relations is provided.
Background And History
Belmont is a residential community eight miles west of Boston.10
It is a town known for its wealth, stability, and fiscal and political
conservatism. Eighty-eight percent of its land is residential; the
largest employer is a hospital. The average income of its residents
is $14,900.00, 138 percent of the state average per capita income
(1977 data). The current population is 27,700, 1,000 fewer residents
than in 1960. The town has been, and to a great extent continues to
be, predominately "Yankee." The late 1960's did see a small influx
of the more well-to-do working class from Cambridge, Somerville, and
other surrounding towns into Belmont, particularly the Waverly Square
area. The historic conservatism has not been changed, however; in the
November 1980 elections, more than 60 percent of the voters voted for
Reagan, 58 percent for Proposition 2 .
The structure of government is a representional town meeting with
executive authority vested in the Board of Selectmen. Town meeting,
10Information on Belmont was gathered through review of town records,
annual reports from 1965 through 1980, the town newspapers, the
Belmont Citizen and Belmont Herald, union contracts and records,
and particularly from interviews with town and union officials and
their legal representatives. Much of the information on the
structure of government and perspectives of management was provided
by Mary Lucci, a colleague at M.I.T., and to whom I owe a great
debt. Without her help and motivation, the project of understanding
Belmont would have been infinitely more difficult and less agreeable.
held annually, usually in April (though special sessions may be called
throughout the year), is the legislative forum for authorizing budgets,
policies and amendments to the Town's by-laws. The agenda is set prior
to the meeting by the Selectmen. The budget process, which is based
on a fiscal year extending from July 1 to June 30, begins with guide-
lines established by the Selectmen being passed to town departments
for detailed formulation. The departmental budgets are then returned
to the Selectmen and a special committee -- the Warrant Committee --
for review. Disagreements which are not resolved among the parties
beforehand are discussed publicly at the town meeting.
The Board of Selectmen -- comprised of two members and a chair-
person elected for 3-year terms -- is charged with the day-to-day
operations of the town. Open meetings are commonly held once a week;
certain matters, particularly those relating to personnel or collective
bargaining, may be discussed in private, or executive sessions. The
Selectmen generally have much greater access to information than the
average citizen or town meeting representative and therefore have
considerable influence over both the specifics of government operations
and general policy. The authority of the Selectmen is somewhat
constrained, however, by the annual budget totals set at town meeting,
and the existence of several commissions and departments headed by
elected officials which do not fall under the direct control of the
Board. These include the library, housing authority, school committee,
health department, cemeteries, sewers and water. Personnel matters
and collective bargaining, apart from the school system, are within
the exclusive domain of the Selectmen.
The town budget has grown from $3.5 million in 1955 to $10.5
million in 1970 to $21.6 million in 1979. Since 1965 the growth has
approximated a steady $1 million per year. The tax rate per $ thousand
has increased from $23 in 1968, the year of 100 percent reevaluation,
to $53.75 in 1975 to $67.00 in 1979. This increase was less gradual,
with several substantial jumps clustered around several years of similar
rates."1 The majority of the Town's income comes from real estate
taxes -- 70.5 percent in 1979. The motor vehicle excise accounts for
only 4.9 percent (the distribution is not unusual for a town of Bel-
mont's size but is considerably different from the larger and older
cities, such as Boston). State aid provides 12.9 percent and local
receipts another 10.8 percent. Of the $21.6 million total budget for
1979, more than half (60 percent) was appropriated for wages and sala-
ries of the town's employees. The largest portion of this was, by
far, for school personnel, followed by police and fire. The latter
two account for roughly 15 percent of the total budget (16 percent if
all expenditures are included). Pension costs take 5 percent of the
budget, not unusual for a town of Belmont's size and wealth.
"Belmont's 1980 tax rate was below the state average; the full value
tax rate (assessment ratio times rate) for the town was $37.00
compared to a $40.00 rate for towns of comparable population.
The Board of Selectmen have played the role of both the town
managers and the keepers of fiscal austerity since the 40-year period
of J. Watson Flett's membership (and chairmanship for much of that
time) on the Board between 1924 and 1963. Flett essentially ruled the
town by himself with considerable attention to the efficiency of govern-
ment. 1 2 His fiscal policy was severe; many of the town's capital
projects were paid for in cash during that period. The current Select-
men are known for their professionalism and careful financial policies.
According to the town labor counsel, Belmont is the best fiscally managed
town in the state, and it has one of the four triple A bond ratings
among Massachusetts towns.
In recent years, the Selectmen have perceived a loss of power brought
about by increased state mandated programs, the unions, and the growth
of the school budget. Much of this perceived loss of control affects
fiscal management, particularly critical for the Belmont Selectmen
due to their pride in maintaining the tradition of fiscal austerity
set by Flett. There is a greater issue, however, in that with increasing
independence of the budget from the authority of the Selectmen, control
over government operations is also disbursed and their sole authority
appears to be eroded. 1 3 Because of the decentralized nature of labor
relations, compared to the externally imposed state programs and
12 Interview with Chip O'Hare, Selectmen, conducted by Mary Lucci
in March, 1981.
13 Ibid.
autonomy of the school committee, the Selectmen's perception of a
power loss was to have greater effect on the status of the unions
after the passage of Proposition 2 . A power struggle of sorts had
already emerged from the historical context.
Labor Relations
Public employee unionization in Belmont followed on the tail of
the national boom in public sector union growth. The firefighters
organized first, in 1966, becoming a local of the International Fire-
fighters Association, AFL-CIO. The American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, followed, organizing
custodians, highway, recreation, and cemetery workers. Police were
organized in 1971 as an independent association; in 1973, they joined
the International Brotherhood of Police Officers as two locals, one
of patrolmen, one for superiors. The remainder of town employees
unionized in late 1972, early 1973. Professional librarians are
represented by the Belmont Librarians Association, municipal light
department workers by the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, and clerical, secretarial, foremen, and assistant department
heads are organized under the Belmont Administrative and Clerical
Association. Together, these seven unions represent roughly 300 of
the 312 town employees. Police and fire membership are by far the
largest, accounting for nearly half of all town employees. The two
unions are also the strongest in the town. Each union bargains separa-
tely with the Selectmen through a bargaining committee. Generally,
contracts are for two-year terms, commencing July 1 of even-numbered
years.
The nature of the relationship between the town and its employees
has evolved considerably since the 1960's. Prior to unionization,
wages, benefits, and working conditions were set entirely by the Select-
men. Employee leadership would go up to the town hall, "hat in hand",
and be given whatever the Selectmen deemed appropriate. Employees'
were "at the mercy", of the Selectmen, outcomes were frequently dependent
upon the personal inclinations of particular individuals.1 4 Work hours
and to a lesser extent, wages, did improve somewhat over time, keeping
pace with conditions throughout the state. Public sentiment towards
reduction in work hours was particularly strong, which inspired
shorter work weeks even prior to unionization. Employees had no input
into the terms and conditions of work, however, and their status rela-
tive to the private sector was considerably low.
Unionization in the beginning of the decade meant a transformation
from an informal to a formal relationship between employer and employee
over the conditions and terms of work. The first contracts were
negotiated under the old state statute (Chapter 149S). Procedures were
formalized, and some gains in wages and benefits were made. The general
perception, however, was that the statute lacked sufficient "bite" to
redress the previously unequitable status of employee to employer.
1 4Both Chief Shea (former superior officer's union president) and
Roy Sacco, president of the firefighters, used similar terminology
when discussing this time period.
Negotiations were still fairly unstructured, carried out between a
Selectman and a union leader, without the involvement of professionals.
The language of first contracts were based on union "boiler plates"
and formed the basis for future negotiations; the real power of the
language, however, was not yet in place.
Further rounds of collective bargaining brought increasing pro-
fessionalism to the negotiation process. The 1973 town annual report
mentions the need for a professional labor negotiator. The Board of
Selectmen felt that their initial response to unionization had been
naive, that all but two of the employee unions had used professional
negotiators in the FY 74 negotiations, and that the cost of a profes-
sional's salary would be more than made up by the savings to the town.
A full-time labor consultant, Alan Drachman, was hired for the first
time by the town in 1974. The firefighters had engaged the services
of a labor attorney, John Hiatt, who has remained the firefighters
representative; the police hired a negotiator provided by the IBPO.
1974 was also the first year under the new comprehensive labor relations
law, Chapter 150E, which permitted binding arbitration for impasse
resolution in police and fire negotiations. No longer were issues of
wage and working conditions a matter for informal discussion.
The quality of labor relations has varied during this period and
among different unions. In general, a certain respect held by both
fire and police for the Selectmen (the current situation aside).
The firefighters, affiliated with a strong state-wide organization,
are perhaps the most forceful union and have resorted to outside inter-
vention in the negotiations with greater frequency. They have gone to
factfinding twice, last-best-offer arbitration once. The latter occurred
during the first year of Chapter 150E; the town's last offer was
awarded, though firefighter sentiment indicates that the evolution of
the process resulted in an acceptable resolution for both parties.
In 1976, the issue of minimum manning for firefighters came to a height,
as the town was attempting to eliminate the clausewhich had been in
the contract since 1972. It was resolved through the decision in the
Danvers case, and minimum manning per vehicle and shift has remained --
though contested -- since.
The police, in contrast, have had a history of settling contracts
with less struggle. Only in the 1980 contract negotiations did they
seek external help. In part, this may be attributed to the secondary
role relative to the firefighters. According to Hiatt, the firefighters
bargain with the Town first and are the most aggressive.
While the unions generally perceive relations with management to
be fairly good -- though dependent upon the authority granted them in
state law -- the management perspective is different. The inclusion
of a special section on collective bargaining in the annual reports
since 1976 has reflected a growing concern with labor relations. The
reports have indicated in particular a complaint that state legislation
has resulted in the loss of management control and caused the town
considerable financial expense. The passage of binding arbitration
for police and fire in 1973 and its renewal in 1977 were not popular
with the town officials. The 1976 annual report registered consider-
able hope that the act not be renewed, stating that "the Town of Belmont
labor costs have increased more than they would have had binding arbi-
tration not existed". The creation of the Joint Labor Management
Committee was similarly disfavored. The state also passed certain
acts which could be adopted by municipalities; their existence and
adoption by surrounding towns frequently led to pressures for their
adoption in Belmont. The police incentive bill (Quinn Bill), providing
wage increases for educational improvement was one such act passed
in 1971 (and adopted in Belmont), as was another enabling towns to pay
more than 50 percent of employee insurance costs which led to pro-
tracted negotiations in 1976. The annual report of that year made the
statement that no matter how successful the negotiations (in preventing
an increase in the town's payment) were, the matter would continue to be
an issue as long as other towns increased the proportion of premium
paid.
Civil Service regulation has also been of growing (disfavorable)
concern. On the wave of the reform movement, Belmont adopted Civil
Service control over the police chief in the early 1900's and over the
fire chief in 1938; the police and fire department coverage soon followed.
In the 1950's, laborers were also put under Civil Service status. The
town's union contracts specifically defer to the Civil Service regula-
tions. Recently, the town officials have expressed their displeasure
with the system. In 1978, there was an unsuccessful attempt to remove
town employees from its coverage. This spring, a town vote removed
the 82 laborer-service employees but failed to remove the police and
fire chief from Civil Service regulation. An act to eliminate coverage
for the entire police and fire departments is on the Warrant for the
April town meeting, and being contested by the unions.
Besides expressing displeasure at state interference with local
labor relations, the town has attempted to regain some of its lost
status vis a vis the unions in more direct ways. In 1979, a new labor
counsel was hired, out of a concern that relations between the union
and management negotiator had gotten too familiar (collusive perhaps).
The town sought a more aggressive negotiator to represent their interests
with greater attention.1 5
Bargaining over contract terms begins in Belmont in March, prior
to the annual town meeting where the budget is set. Bargaining commit-
tees of each union meet with the Selectmen and/or the town labor counsel.
Though the negotiations must commence prior to the town meeting, it
is not stipulated that resolve be reached by that time; frequently,
negotiations continue on past the expiration date of the old contract.
The scope of contracts and bargaining for police and fire was
basically set with the initial contracts within the state statute.
Major provisions include: a no-strike agreement; an established grievance
procedure; compensation; benefit; work hours provisions; an agreement
1 5Joan Garland, executive administrator to the Selectmen, April 1981.
that matters of promotions, seniority, discharge, and removal be regu-
lated by Civil Service regulations; and a town's right clause. The
focus of negotiation demands has been -- until the recent situation --
primarily on economic issues, wages and benefits. The unions have
pushed for wage increases, clothing allowances, overtime and extra-
duty payments, night shift differentials payment, vacation time, and
such things as educational allowances and EMT payments. Work schedules
have also been important issues. Shift hours and work week schedules,
as well as total hours worked, have been redefined under collective
bargaining.
Issues of internal operation of the departments have primarily
centered around the order in which personnel are given extra-duty,
overtime, and shift assignments. The union demand was essentially for
formalization of procedure. The grievance procedure, the creation of
which was, and continues to be, a key benefit derived from unionization,
is a concern but primarily in guarding the existing provisions. The
firefighters' contract does include certain provisions concerning
internal organization not covered in the police contract. A table of
organization, specifying the number of firefighters, number of superiors,
and manning for apparatus has been included since 1972. Minimum manning
per shift is also stipulated in the contract. The firefighters gain
if such provisions not only reflect greater power but also provide
considerable security to its employees and access to other forms of
protection. The police have no such provisions, nor are they mandatory
subjects of bargaining, though minimum manning is for firefighters.
No other provisions for control over internal management or organiza-
tion are included in the contents except perhaps for a joint safety
committee in the police, nor has there been any interest or attempt
to discuss such issues by the unions.
As the unions were demanding increased wages and benefits, fewer
working hours, and greater clarification of internal procedures, the
town management was striving to keep costs down. The fiscal austerity
of the Selectmen, continued fairly consistently since Flett, mandated
an attitude of conservatism; it should be noted, however, that fiscal
constraint was a matter of policy, not necessarily dictated by econo-
mic reality. Several strategies were feasible for constraining the
wage bill; limiting employment, limiting wage and benefit increases,
or manipulation of such matters as shift differentials, and differen-
tials in pay based on tenure. In 1970, the town annual report recorded
the attempt by the town to keep the work force at a minimum and approach
a no-hire, no-fire policy to keep expenditures from rising. Indeed,
police and fire employment have 'not increased to any great extent since;
nor have hours of work been reduced. Pay differentials have increased
in both unions, between ranks (from 13 percent in 1974 to 15 percent in
1980) in both unions, and between new hires and older personnel in the
police. (The police differentials are substantially larger than fire.)
A key strategy used by the town to maintain labor peace is
parity of wage and benefits among the different unions. The town has
an explicit policy of attempting to maintain such parity, particularly
between police and fire, and has been able to do so except in the 1974
negotiations when the firefighters won an increase through arbitration.16
Comparability with other similar towns is also used to help determine
an appropriate level of wages; both town and unions conduct wage and
benefit surveys to this effect, though its actual influence on negotia-
tions, except when brought to the state mediation bodies, is question-
able.
Management has also attempted to limit the scope of clauses which
hinder personnel movement. The minimum manning and table of organiza-
tion in the firefighter t s contract has been an issue at each round of
negotiations. Grievance procedures have similarly been the target of
management representatives, in the attempt to limit the scope.
The unions have made gains in what they demanded. Wage increases
granted police and fire employees have varied between 5--8% per year
since 1971. Benefits have increased in both magnitude and scope,
particularly for clothing allowances, educational allowances, and
longevity payments. Vacation time, holidays, overtime pay and grievance
procedures have not substantially changed in either department since
the first contracts. Police and fire wages have increased roughly
65 percent since 1970. Compared to other towns, Belmont's employee
compensation for fire and police is fairly generous. Wage packages
16Ibid.
are close to, if not above, those in the surrounding towns. Relative
to the total town budget, expenditures on wages and salaries (which
includes benefits except pensions) for both police and fire have not
changed substantially. In 1955, salaries and wages for both departments
represented 11 percent of the total budget. In 1968, the percent rose
to 13 percent and remained there for most of the seventies. In 1979,
public safety wages and salaries accounted for 15 percent of the total
budget. Salaries and wages were 91 percent of the police department
appropriations in 1979; 97 percent of the fire department's. It is
fairly clear that the economic gains made by the unions were funded
through a revenue expansion, not reallocation of a fixed budget.
Given the ability of Belmont residents to pay, such expansion was not
necessarily disputed by others besides the Selectmen. In sum, Belmont
appears as a wealthy, stable community where considerable emphasis
is placed on order and maintenance of the status quo. The town is
tightly run by Selectmen who take pride in professional management
and fiscal conservatism, and who have little inclination to disburse
power to other interests. It is their perception that local autonomy
and their authority over it have been eroded in the last decade;
their aspiration to regain control as the center of political and
fiscal power is not lessened, however. The policy of fiscal austerity
followed by the Selectmen is a matter of choice, not need, and it is
unlikely that the financial stability under which Belmont currently
operates will be substantially threatened in the future.
The beginnings of public employee unionization did not inspire
great concern; only with the increase in union power, brought about
by state legislation and through the accumulation of tradition, did the
town begin to perceive a "problem". The police and fire soon emerged
as the strongest unions in the town, a none-too-surprising occurrence,
given the state legislation favoring police and fire, the greater cohe-
sion among the membership, and the particulars of public safety pro-
vision. The unions used their power to obtain much of what was sought,
primarily increased wages and benefits, shorter work hours, and formali-
zation of grievance procedures. Some security of job was provided by
civil service status. The town expanded its budget to fund the union
gains, and no threat of loss of employment was evident. Neither police
nor fire perceived an environment of hostility with management prior
to the summer of 1980.
The negotiations for the 1980-82 contracts did depart from the
norm in several ways worth mentioning. For one, there was a new town
labor counsel, Robert Crowe, hired to be agressive in pursuit of the
Selectmen's interests. A wage increase of 7 and 8 percent (1981
and 1982) was granted, but no increase in benefits. The firefighters
and other unions except the patrolmen settled relatively easily. The
patrolmen, however, sought a larger increase taking negotiations into
October. A petition with the Joint Labor Management Committee was
filed, a first for the police, but settlement on the 7 and 8 percent
wage package was reached prior to its acceptance. (David Downs, attorney
with the IBPO, joined Ed Colman during the summer and provided legal
assistance.) Also during this time period, Police Chief Kiley was
in the process of retiring; Robert Shea, the president of the Superior
Officers local, was the prime candidate for his replacement, and though
he bargained over the new contract for the union, he was said to have
kept a low profile. His promotion entailed a transition from labor
to management, and put his interests in questionable status.
Of more importance, in retrospect, was Crowe's success during the
negotiations in strengthening the town's rights clause in both Police
and Fire contracts. The clause for both prior to 1980 had been some-
what ambiguous in the exact rights of management to control personnel
within each department. The Police contract clause received the
greatest alteration, as it was not greatly contested by the union or
the negotiator. The following was added: "It is agreed that manage-
ment officials of the Town shall at all times retain the right to
direct employees, to hire, promote, transfer, assign and retain employees,
within the Police Department ... to relieve employees from duties
because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, to maintain
the efficiency of the operations entrusted to them, to determine the
methods, means, and personnel by which such operations are to be
conducted and to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out
the mission of the Police Department." The language was more hotly
contested in firefighter negotiations and resulted in a weaker, through
ambiguity, version.
The firefighters' contract was amended as follows: "Subject to
the provisions of this Agreement, the employer reserves and retains
all the regular and customary rights and prerogatives of municipal
management, including, for example, the right to determine the means,
methods, and personnel by which its operation are to be conducted; to
determine the mission of the (Fire) Department and the methods and
means necessary to fulfill that mission; and the taking of all neces-
sary actions to carry out its mission in emergencies." During the
firefighters' negotiation, the town also attempted to delete the table
of organization for the department, the minimum manning articles, and
redefine the grievance procedure, none of which were gained by the town.
It is interesting to question the reasons that the changes in the
management clauses were not more hotly disputed by the unions. David
Downs, the IBOP attorney who only became involved in Belmont late in
the summer negotiations, believed that the police union had made a
mistake in accepting the change, particularly as nothing was gained
in exchange. His explanation was that locals in general tend to be
more concerned with their immediate economic gains and sometimes over-
look aspects of bargaining postures which have great potential for
affecting other conditions of work. 1 7 As was to come to light later in
the case, there was a more fundamental issue at heart; neither fire
nor police union membership really believed that the union had the right
to affect basic decisions concerning either the organization of a
17David Downs, March 1981.
department or, ultimately, the level of personnel. The distinction
between management and union rights was fairly clear to the union
members, and though they were to contest management decisions, they
never fundamentally believed in their right to share in the making of
them. It was the union's attorneys who maintained the right of labor
to affect the actual decision of management, not just its impact, and
therefore the difference in the contract clause changes between police
and fire is explained more by the absence of an attorney representing
the Police in the negotiations than by differences between unions.
The significance of the change in language was not to become
clearly evident until after the passage of Proposition 2 . The ability
of the Selectmen to lay off police personnel "for legitimate reasons",
had been clearly spelled out. That of the firefighters was less clear,
particularly in view of the continuation of minimum manning and the
table of organization, though nonetheless strengthened relative to that
in previous years.
Belmont And Proposition 2
On November 4, 1980, the majority of Belmont residents voted for
Proposition 2 , as did those of the state. The Board of Selectmen and
the public employees unions had waged an active campaign against the bill,
both parties stressing the possible impact on service levels, and
probable layoffs. The town newspapers reported the possibility that
ten police officers would be laid off should the bill pass. Nonethe-
less, the 60 percent of the Belmont voters approved the bill.
The impact of 2 on Belmont is considerably less severe than in
many of its surrounding towns. Though the property tax represented
70 percent of town revenues, the levy was not far from the 2 percent
limit. It was originally estimated that it would take the town one
year to reach 2 , with a loss of $2.5 million. The town has since
petitioned the State Board of Revenue and Taxation for an increase in
its tax assessment ratio to reflect inflation (Belmont had reached
100 percent evaluation in 1979, and thus sought to update its rate).
If granted, which is extremely likely, the increased ratio will more
than make up for any loss through the tax percent limit. Revenues
from property taxes would be no less in FY 82 than for FY 81.
There was a direct and immediate impact of the bill on 1981
revenues, however, through the loss in motor vehicle excise revenues
totalling $800,000.00. Because the town had already set its tax rate
for the year, and because the excise tax reduction was effective in
January of 1981, the operating (non-fixed cost) town budget was to suffer
a 4.2 percent loss. The town also expected to face future deficits,
despite an increase in assessment ratio, through the continued loss of
excise tax revenue, inflation, and the bargained wage increase.
The town did have at this time considerable reserves of money.
A total of $1,000,000.00 was available as certified free cash and
$500,000.00 was in the Reserve Fund, a fund established to cover unfore-
seen emergencies. Due to the destruction of a local school building
through fire, an insurance payment of $225,000.00 was also available
and as yet undesignated. The available monies were clearly sufficient
to cover the immediate shortage, and their existence have had considerable
impact on the negotiations which followed. The Selectmen have main-
tained throughout their prerogative in reserving these funds and
compensating for the $800,000.00 in other ways.
A Selectman also indicated that more was at stake. The process
of coping with Proposition 2 was seen by the Selectmen as "an oppor-
tunity to make fundamental changes in the management of the Town which
had been needed ... and were otherwise impossible, and "a substantial
opportunity to regain lost power". 1 8 There is some indication that
management felt that problems of productivity existed in some of the
town departments, and that layoffs would not necessarily have an impact
on service levels, particularly in police and fire. The 2 "crisis"
therefore became a means of increasing efficiency under the guise of
fiscal constraint. The opportunity to regain the integrity of the
Selectmen's authority had appeared to have arrived. It should also be
noted that Bob Crowe saw a similar opportunity, not loss, in the passage
of Proposition 2 ; it meant a redressing of the previously unbalanced
power distribution between management and unions, in favor of manage-
ment.1 9
The Selectmen moved quickly after the election. The Board, the
town treasurer and the town accountant met the following Saturday to
discuss strategies. On November 10, the Selectmen issued two executive
1 8Chip O'Hare, in interview conducted by Mary Lucci, 3/81.
19Bob Crowe, March 1981.
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orders prohibiting new hires or changes in classification, overtime,
and capital expenditures, and suspended all free services--rubbish
collection, ambulance, fuse changes, lock outs, and highway department
services.
By late November the decision had been made to split the $800,000.00
loss evenly between the school department and the rest of the town budget,
reflecting the general distribution of budget appropriations. The
Selectmen informed each department that net savings of 4.2 percent to
4.5 percent would have to be made across the board, either through
cuts or institution of fees. The board held budget meetings in closed
session -- claiming the relevancy of budget discussions to collective
bargaining issues -- to determine the nature of budget savings within
each department. A letter dated November 19 from Bob Crowe, the town
labor counsel hired in 1979, was sent to police and fire union presidents
and department chiefs mentioning that lay-offs were being considered
and offering to bargain over impact of layoff, or other alternative
means of service level reduction.
Both David Downs, attorney for the two police locals, and John
Hiatt, attorney for the firefighters, responded affirmatively to Bob
Crowe's offer to bargain. At the same time, they each began what was
to be a sustained battle over the definition of the "duty to bargain"
over reductions in service levels. Downs and Hiatt both maintained
that the town had the duty to bargain over the decision on how reductions
in service were to be effective -- essentially the decision to lay off;
Crowe refuted such a definition, stating that the determination of
means of reduction was a core governmental decision and thus within
management's prerogative. Though the issue was never resolved in the
Belmont case, and though it had little direct significance in the final
outcome, the discrepancy in interpetration of the law reflects the
leeway within legal definitions, open to resolution through power
struggle.
After the preliminary correspondence, Crowe set up an informational
meeting to which all union officials were invited. At the meeting,
held on December 10, Crowe and the town accountant presented the town's
financial statements and the expected losses from 2 . Proposed cuts
in departmental budgets which the Selectmen had generated were also
presented. Crowe indicated that the Selectmen would be meeting with
department heads over the next two weeks to determine the manner of
reductions. Following the meeting, both attorneys sent to Crowe formal
requests to bargain over the issues the Town had raised.
During December, the local newspaper was carrying considerable
coverage of Proposition 2 and its likely impacts. An article on the
llth mentioned that the town officials agreed that the brunt of cuts
would be felt in the larger departments such as highway, police, fire,
and schools. Trade-offs, i.e., foregoing all or part of negotiated
raises and benefits were suggested by the officials, though the chair-
man of the Board expressed the expectation that unions would not agree
to such tradeoffs. 20
2 0Belmont Citizen, December 11, 1980.
On January 8, Bob Crowe met with police and fire union represen-
tatives individually and presented them with a statement. The Board of
Selectmen had held twelve special meetings to consider the loss of the
motor vehicle excise tax revenue and, based on its thorough review,
the "Board had approved the following economy measures", including the
layoff of eight firefighters and eight police officers (one position
vacant due to the discharge of an officer was not to be filled)
effective February 1. Five of the eight firefighters were civil service
tenured; none of the police officers were but were all to become eligible
on February 10, nine days after the proposed layoffs. The layoff of
firefighters was expected to save $52,726.00. The ambulance was also
to be transferred from the police department to reduce the need for
further layoffs. The eight police layoffs and the single vacancy not
filled would save $59,441.00. Each person was to receive two weeks
vacation pay and two weeks severance pay, not incorporated in the savings
calculations. The police and fire cost reductions represented roughly
one-fourth of the $408,000.00 to be covered by the excise tax loss.
Layoffs in other departments were not proposed as savings were
to be achieved in other ways. AFSCME had had three highway laborers
laid off in November, and the positions of three members who had retired
were not to be filled. In BACA, five vacancies due to retirement or
resignation were not to be filled, two full-time vacancies would be
filled by part-time workers and one new part-time position would be
left vacant. Several fees had been instituted for town services and
existing rates and fees raised, plus other cuts made in the smaller
departments.
The most common expression heard in response to the announcement
of lay-offs from union officials, members, and townspeople was shock.
The front page of the Belmont Citizen on January 15 carried pictures of
the sixteen men and the caption, "The Proposition 2 Hit List". A
considerable media campaign by the police and fire was waged against
the layoffs with leaflet drops, extensive newspaper coverage in Belmont
and the statewide papers, and television coverage by WBZ.
On January 19, 500 citizens attended the regularly scheduled Board
of Selectmen's meeting (the average attendance is under ten people) to
protest the layoffs. On January 26, 350 citizens showed up for the
Selectmen's meeting. In response to a resident's comment, "Why can't
we suffer in areas that aren't life threatening?", Board Chairman
Flewelling said, "We have (already) cut to the bone in other departments." 2 1
Notwithstanding public sentiment, the Selectmen voted to implement the
layoffs.
2 1 Belmont Citizen, January 29, 1981
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The Police And Their Union
The single police station in Belmont is located directly across
from Town Hall. All personnel relevant to the police department are
headquartered in the somewhat historic building. The number of police
officers has remained constant at 64 since 1970, when a new shift
schedule required the addition of seven personnel. As with the fire-
fighters, employment is stable; turnover for reasons other than retire-
ment is rare. Also similar to the firefighters, many of the officers,
particularly the younger ones, are not residents of Belmont; as some
suggest, the value of land in the town is high and housing not inexpen-
sive. Base pay for a patrolman is roughly $15,500.00 per year.
Though the majority of police officers serve as uniformed patrol-
men, whose duties include street patrol by foot and vehicle, and
manning the desk, there are several divisions in the department where
the nature of work is substantially different. These include the
detective, juvenile, and traffic bureaus. Personnel within these
divisions are designated as inspectors. It is within the police chief's
prerogative to make assignments to such bureaus, though the procedure has
some relation to tenure on the force. One member, Charlie Wright,
patrolmen's local president in January 1981, runs a counselling and
referral program out of the Health Department for police officers
suffering from stress and abuse of alcohol. Officers are also dis-
tinguished by rank, with 48 patrolmen and 15 superior officers. Pay
differentials among ranks and between new hires and more senior offi-
cers tend to be substantially greater than those found in the fire
department.
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Two IBPO locals represent the police department personnel: Local
449 of the patrolmen and Local 521 of the superior officers. All
officers except the Chief are union members. Union representation is
a fairly recent phenomenon, beginning in 1973, though the IBPO affi-
liation was preceded by a police association which did sign a contract
in 1971. According to one officer, Charlie Wright, major gains under
the union have been formalization and enforcement of the grievance
procedure and the broadening and deepening of benefits. The IBPO
provides the local with access to their, and NAGE's (National Associa-
tion of Government Employees), legal staff. In the summer of 1980,
David Downs, IBPO attorney, was sent to Belmont to aid the locals'
negotiator, Ed Colman, in the bargaining over the new contract. Downs
continued to represent the police locals during the post-2 negotiations.
The passage of Proposition 2 was a surprise to the police depart-
ment. According to Wright and Police Chief Shea, who was president of
Local 521 during the summer negotiations, most public employees believed
that the bill would not pass, "not in Massachusetts". Despite the
close proximity to November 4 of the settlement date for the new con-
tract, no concern during the negotiations was paid to potential impacts
on police personnel as witnessed by the acceptance of the Town's rights
clause amendment.
With the passage of Proposition 2 and the Selectmen's aggressive
stand in budget cutting, the union was put on the defensive. Under the
leadership of David Downs and the bargaining committee, the locals
reacted with three implements -- the legal system, the media, and the
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unity of the membership itself. On February 2, 1981, after consider-
able negotiation between the union and the Town and within the union
itself, the police officers signed an agreement to reduce their nego-
tiated wage increase by 3 percent to a total of 5 percent (representing
roughly a $700.00 loss to each officer) effective July 1 in return
for a guarantee that the eight most junior officers would not be termi-
nated at least through June 30, 1981.
There are a number of factors relevant to the police unions'
access to power which had impact on the course of events which led to
the February agreement. For one, the powers of the contract to prevent
layoffs had been severely limited by the amendment to the management
rights provision during the summer negotiations. The access to the
statutory law was similarly limited by the ambiguity of previous
rulings, as witnessed in the continued debate between Downs and Crowe
over the scope of bargaining. The lack of civil service status also
eliminated a channel to institutional power which the firefighters,
in contrast, could utilize.
There were also factors affecting the internal dynamics of the
union and thus the cohesion and strength of the union during the post-
2 negotiation period. A change in leadership of the patrolmen's
local occurred in December. Phil Leblanc, who had been president
during the previous year, stepped down (according to him, it was out
of a tradition of rotating leadership, rather than due to the context)
and Charlie Wright was elected. Bob Shea, the president of the superiors
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but also the incoming police chief had a dual role during the nego-
tiations. Most importantly, he was throughout the relevant period
in the process of developing a reorganization plan for the department,
which was to affect at least 23 police officers. The plan was initiated
during the summer of 1980 but did not play a significant role in the
outcome of the negotiation process until January. All of the above
had considerable effect in setting the options available and desirable
to the police local and are found intertwined with the events detailed
below.
The process leading to the agreement began with the attempt by
Downs to avoid the certainty of layoffs through bargaining over the
decision. The November 20th letter from Downs to Crowe (in response
to Crowe's initial offer to bargain over impact) stated the union's
position that the issue of layoffs as a means of reducing the level
of service was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and there-
fore it was requested that no action be taken by the town prior to
bargaining. Crowe responded to Downs on the following day, disagreeing
with the police attorney's legal argument, citing the Newton School
Committee case. In Crowe's view, the town was only obligated to bar-
gain over the impact of reductions in service, not a decision to
implement layoffs. He also referred to the town's rights clause in
the 1980-82 contract as providing for management prerogative in
discharging officers. This issue -- the scope of bargaining -- was
never to be litigated or resolved in the police negotiations. A
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letter dated December 2 followed, inviting the union leaders to the
informational meeting on the 10th.
Following the meeting, where financial information was provided
by Crowe and the town accountant, and where Downs and John Hiatt,
the firefighters' attorney, made preliminary contact, Downs wrote to
Crowe requesting further financial information, and formally demanded
to commence bargaining "as regards all mandatory subjects of bargaining".
These mandatory subjects, in Downs' view, "include(d) but are not
limited to the decision as to whether or not the lay off of any member
of the two bargaining units is necessary or the method to be utilized
in reducing the level of law enforcement services". Downs also ex-
pressed concern over the shortage of time in which to generate alterna-
tives to layoffs prior to the January 1 deadline Crowe had indicated.
During December, the town newspaper reported that morale was low
among town employees due to the threat of layoffs. It was also reported
that the Selectmen agreed that the major burden of budget cuts would
fall on the larger departments, including the police and fire. The
possibility of tradeoffs was mentioned officially for the first time. The
leadership of the patrolmen's local was also transferred to Charlie
Wright during December.
On January 8th, Crowe met with Downs and locals' officials. It
was at this meeting that the typed statement of proposed budget cuts
and layoffs of eight patrolmen was presented. At the meeting, Crowe
indicated that the decision was not final and would await generation
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of alternatives by the unions, though his position that management had
the right to make layoff determination was not altered.
The reported reaction in the police department was "shock, anger,
22
disbelief." Downs felt personally that the final decision had been
made, notwithstanding Crowe's contention that alternatives from the
unions were being awaited, and registered offense. A number of different
issues arose out of the reported reactions from the union members.
Considerable concern was held for the officers to be layed off, par-
ticularly as many were married and carrying mortgages and "would not
survive." The men themselves expressed not only economic worry, but
considerable distress over the loss of what they considered to be good
jobs. One mentioned the rewards of "helping people." Many registered
the fact that police work had been a career option for them, sought
after in part for its security.
The impact on the department as a whole was also of importance
for the remaining officers, according to reports. Wright perceived
the layoffs of the junior men-as a loss of young blood, particularly
critical as the remaining force would consist of officers who had
served 12-15 years when "police stress" and the "I don't give a damn"
attitude was in the greatest prevalence. The loss of eight men was
believed to affect the safety of the remaining patrolmen. Claims
were also made that the layoffs would endanger town residents. It was
22Belmont Citizen, January 15, 1981
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here that a disparity between management and employee attitude became
evident, though not a critical issue in the negotiation process. The
town Selectmen and other officials, including incoming Chief Shea,
publicly and privately stated that they expected no loss of quality of
service from the possible layoffs.
Considerable anger was made manifest over the effective date of
the proposed layoffs. The patrolmen were under probationary status
with the Civil Service and would be eligible for tenure rights, in-
cluding the right to a hearing prior to layoff, nine days after the
proposed layoff date. As one officer put it, "they've cut off our
umbilical cord ... our lifeline." 23 The town responded to this
complaint by offering the same recall rights which civil service
tenure would have provided; they did not offer, however, the right to
a hearing.
The eight men to be layed off, Wright, and Downs, met following
the meeting with Crowe to discuss strategy. Wright made it publicly
known that all legal avenues would be pursued to block the layoffs,
though none were instigated at that point in time. Wright was also
reported to have hinted that it was unlikely that the union would
consider giving up its negotiated wage increase in order to save the
jobs, citing a number of occasions in the past where IBPO members had
made "give-backs" and suffered job loss anyway. 2 4
2 3Belmont Citizen, January 15, 1981
2 4Ibid.
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One strategy did emerge -- the attempt to enlist public support
as a means to influence management. The union actively sought media
coverage. Through personal contact, a television station reporter
was brought into the town and instigated considerable press and t.v.
coverage of the Belmont situation, not only in the town, but throughout
the state. Some coordination with the firefighters was made over the
media campaign, though the latter were not as aggressive in seeking out
the media. A door-to-door leaflet drop was also made, the sum of which
all helped to heighten public awareness and support for public employees,
which was expected to increase the power advantage of the police.
The first negotiation session between the local and Crowe was
set for January 15 to begin "impact bargaining".
The bargaining committee for Local 449 formed for the layoff
negotiations included Wright, Downs, and in a break in tradition, a
junior officer, included out of relevance for the situation. The list
generated by the Selectmen of potential layoffs made it clear that
superior officers were not affected and the local dropped out of
negotiations. Two sets of proposed had been generated, primarily by
Downs, to be presented to Crowe. (Under normal contract bargaining,
the procedure prior to negotiation generally begins with solicitations
for proposals from the membership at large which are then refined by
the committee prior to presentation at the bargaining table. The
procedure followed here departed from the normal due to the time shortage,
the financial complexity of town records, and the presence of an
attorney, as opposed to a negotiator.) The first set proposed to
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match the savings from layoffs was as follows: (1) apply $59,440.00
of the $250,000.00 insurance premium rebate received by the town due to
a recent destruction by fire of a school, or (2) apply $59,440.00 of
the town's free cash, estimated at $1,029,393.00. The town rejected
both.
The second set, proposed at the same meeting, was as follows:
(1) lay off five civilian dispatcher/clerks ($11,132.00) (not union
members); (2) keep ambulance service in the police department, with
the recently added service fee; (3) offer an incentive for early
retirement within the Police Department and throughout local government,
the amount of which was to be negotiated; (4) a combination of: eight
officers slated for layoff would forgo the EMT payment of $300.00 each;
eliminate summertime employees; eliminate civilian clerks for the
remainder of the year; one less tenant; eliminate the sergeant currently
on leave of absence; eliminate school traffic supervisors; the total of
which would save $81,462.00 for the remainder of the fiscal year. The
union, backed by the IBPO, in response to the concern over Civil Service
tenure eligibility, also offered to give up $10,000.00 in holiday pay
and donate $2,000.00 to allow the eight policemen to continue on the
town payroll through February 30.
All the union proposals were rejected. Crowe gave as reasons for
the rejection of the two sets of proposals the lack of sufficient
savings: "they (the union) offered no money savings alternatives such
as cuts on fringe benefits." "The layoffs will save $60,000.00 this
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year and $170,000.00 next year; what they offered was a drop in the bucket."
The proposal to keep the officers on beyond the February 10 tenure
eligibility date was rejected, according to Crowe, because it was not
ratified by the union membership and because it was made before the
union realized that the town was offering reinstatement rights to the
junior officers.2 5
Four days later, on January 19, 500 citizens attended the regu-
larly scheduled Selectmen's meeting to oppose the layoffs. The meeting
was noteworthy in the "veiled challenge" made to the unions. Board of
Selectmen Chairman Flewelling issued "a challenge to the unions to help
us cope with these difficult problems and for your cooperation to help
us save these jobs. And I ask, who has done the most to save these jobs
-- the town of Belmont or the unions." Flewelling denied, however, that
he was specifically asking the unions to give up the negotiated pay
increase. Downs reported to the press that he found the "challenge" to
be a "sneaky trick," "It smacks of union busting .. It seems to be
shifting the blame onto us that now somehow the unions failed."
Wright concurred and labeled the statement a "management ploy." 2 6
On January 21, Crowe approached the local and made his "final offer"
-- that the union give up half (4 percent of the 8 percent) of its
negotiated increase for FY 1982 in return for an agreement that no
officers would be layed off prior to June 30; should more than four be
2 5Belmont Citizen, January 22, 1981.
2 6Ibid.
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layed off after July 1, the increase would be reinstated. Bargaining
for the 1982-84 contract would not be affected by the give-back.
Downs signed an agreement with Crowe that the bargaining committee
would make a good faith effort to obtain membership ratification of the
proposal on January 22.
The town would save $43,000.00 in FY 82 from the wage increase cut,
in contrast to the $59,000.00 saved in FY 81 (and $170,000.00 yearly
thereafter) from implementation of layoffs. It is not clear why the
town was willing to so substantially alter the amount of savings it was
requesting. One factor may have been the revised estimate of property
tax loss (or lack thereof) from the raising of the assessment ratio.
Another may have been the realization of the substantial costs that
would be incurred in unemployment compensation from the layoffs. The
change in fiscal demand calls into question, however, the real motivation
behind the Selectmen's actions and how it came to be influenced through
the course of testing their power, relative to the unions and the town
at large. It is clear that at no point was the town in dire fiscal
straits and unable to cover the lost excise tax revenue through the
utilization of reserves. All union actors involved feel strongly --
in retrospect -- that the Selectmen were attempting more than mere
financial savings by initiating the layoff action.2 7
A formal meeting of the Local 449 membership was called on January
25 to vote on the town's proposal. After considerable debate, the
2 7Downs, Sacco, Wright have all indicated that they do not understand
what was motivating the Selectmen.
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local voted 18-12 to table the motion until the end of February,
effectively rejecting it, given the January 26 deadline imposed by
Crowe. Charlie Wright resigned as president of the local following
the vote, believing the proposal to be a fair one and saying that he
"could not represent men whose attitudes totally differed from (his)
own."2 8 Later interviews revealed that Wright had not perceived the
monetary loss as significant, in contrast to others such as Phil
LeBlanc, the local's president during the previous year, who already
believed the 8 percent wage increase to be insufficient in light of
inflation, and placed much higher value on the loss of the money through
the proposal. LeBlanc has said the proposal was unfair.2 9
Several reasons are offered for the outcome of the vote. The
local paper reported that some members had not voted, feeling that it
would have caused "hard feelings either way." Others had opposed it
believing that the union should not be asked to "subsidize" the public
service jobs, and some feeling that insufficient time had been given
to consider the proposal. 3 0 Wright, in retrospect, felt that those
who had opposed it were motivated not out of greed, but out of a strong
unionism and belief in not opening up a contract that had been nego-
tiated. One officer, slated to be laid off, said in a newspaper inter-
view that though he was upset to 1-ose his job, "I'd rather lose my
2 8Belmont Herald, January 29, 1981, and in interview with Wright,
April, 1981.
2 9Phil LeBlanc, April, 1981.
3 0Belmont Citizen, January 29, 1981.
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job before I'd see my Brother officers lose something from the Town." 3 1
A certain element of disbelief, or feeling that the town was bluffing,
was also said to be prevalent.
According to Downs, the IBPO played a fairly neutral role in the
membership's consideration of wage increase cut proposal. A repre-
sentative of the union had come to the Local meeting and stated the
International's policy that contracts not be opened. Downs had reiterated
that position but had also told the local membership that the IBPO
would support the local no matter what position they took. Downs
attempted to remain neutral once the proposal had been presented.
Crowe claimed that the bargaining committee had gone back on its word
and charged it with bad faith bargaining.
The January 26 Selectmen's meeting was attended by 350 townspeople.
The Selectmen, saying its was the most painful decision they had yet
made on the Board, voted unanimously to lay off eight firefighters and
seven police officers. One officer was on leave of absence already.
He was not to return but was not considered a direct layoff. Preceding
the Board's vote, a closed-door hearing on the layoffs in the fire
department, as required by Civil Service regulations, was held. The
town's hearing officer had found that there was "just cause" for the
layoffs. Any belief in a management bluff was dispelled.
In response to the Selectmen's vote, Downs began to set the legal
strategy in motion. He filed and received a temporary restraining
3 1Ibid.
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order from the Middlesex Court on January 28 prohibiting the town
from implementing the layoffs. Downs filed the following actions:
Complaint of prohibitive practice with the Labor Relations Commission,
on the theory that the town had bargained in bad faith by (1) having
made a unilateral decision to lay off without bargaining with the union
(the disputed issue of scope of bargaining) and (2) surface bargaining,
meaning that their minds had been made up and they were unwilling to
reconsider during the negotiations; a grievance under contract over
the right of management to lay off, claiming that "legitimate cause
for discharge" was not proven; a petition to determine impasse over
bargaining with the JLMC; and a complaint with the Civil Service
Commission, claiming that the junior officers slated for layoff were
in fact tenured and had the right of hearing. The IBPO was also chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Proposition 2 in the Superior Court
along with three other unions.
The viability of the legal arguments was never very strong, either
in perception or reality. Downs believed (and still maintains) that
the town did have the legal duty to bargain over the decision, not
just the impact, of layoffs, but whether the Labor Relations Commission
would so rule was never a surety. It should be noted that Charlie
Wright came to believe that indeed, the union did not have the right
to bargain over the decision, that it was a clear management preroga-
tive to determine the nature of service reduction. By Down's own
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admission, the grievance under contract was a weak argument, given the
language in the management right's clause. The referral to the JLMC
would have resulted in a delay, but the outcome of their review was
not predictable. The constitutionality issue in the superior court
would have taken considerable time to be heard, whatever the ruling.
The receipt of a temporary restraining order was a slightly hopeful
sign, however, that there was some recourse to the legal system.
During the days in between the first and last vote by the union
over the proposal, there were several important dynamics occurring
within the department. Incoming Police Chief Shea made clear to the men
what the impacts of the layoffs would be on the organization of the
department. He had developed a reorganization plan previously with
the possibility of layoffs in mind (although a reorganization was not
necessarily contingent on the loss of men). Shea had made it clear
publicly and to the department that his first priority was maintaining
the level of uniformed street patrol. With a loss of patrolmen, this
policy would necessitate the reassignment of traffic and juvenile detec-
tive inspectors back into uniform and onto the street. As the
inspectors generally had seniority, they would bump regular patrolmen
on the day shift to the night shift, to cover the loss of the junior
men. Such reorganization would affect more than a third of the
department and include superior officers as well as patrolmen. It
should also be recognized that the layoffs would affect the partnership
relationships.32
3 2Chief Shea and Charlie Wright, March 1981.
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Considerable dissension was evident within the department. The
vote to table the proposal was not unanimous. There were obvious
differences of opinion between the leadership, as Wright's perception
of the proposal as "fair" and LeBlanc's as "unfair" indicated.
According to Wright, the majority of the junior patrolmen to be laid
off were not happy with their prospects, and approached him for advice
on how to convince the rest of the department to accept the agreement.
The management perspective was clearly in support of the proposal,
including Shea. It should be remembered that Shea had risen up out
of the ranks of the union membership. He had also worked for the IBPO
prior to coming to Belmont, and thus had good union credentials. There
is some indication also that the department as a whole looked forward
to his leadership as Kiley had not "done much for the department," and
might have wished to maintain good relations with their new boss. 3 3
LeBlanc approached Lt. Roche (Shea's replacement as president of
the superior's union) and asked if the fourteen superior officers would
be willing to forego part of their wage increase and share in the effort
to save the jobs. Though at first resistant, the members agreed and
the wage increase cut was reduced to 3 percent for all police officers.
According to Roche, the superior officers agreed to share in the
reduction because "the feelings we have for each other in the department
transcends any feelings about the unions, 3 4 and that apart from putting
fellow officers out of work, the layoffs increased the risk to the
3 3Charlie Wright, March 1981.
3 4Belmont Citizen, February 5, 1981.
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officers on the street. Downs added as an explanation that there was
some fear that the Quinn Bill (educational allowances and incentives)
would be removed, and that several of the superiors were themselves
junior officers and possibly in line for layoff if more were to occur.
On Friday at 3:00 p.m., the Middlesex Court dissolved a court
order restraining the layoffs. At 4:00 p.m., the union voted unanimously
to accept a 3 percent cut in their negotiated pay increase in return
for the assurance that no layoffs would occur at least until June 30,
1981. All legal actions filed by Downs were also withdrawn, and thus
their outcome was never determined. LeBlanc stated that the union had
been waiting to see what legal avenues brought; Wright thought the
vote had little to do with the court decision, but reflected the police
officers' unselfishness.
The union had regained its unity and maintained a "cooperative
relationship with management. There was some expectation that the
latter would be beneficial in the long run, particularly come July
when new budget cuts might be necessitated. The police also gained the
approval and support of the public, as service level was to be maintained
despite cuts in cost. Shea, a few days later, implemented part of the
reorganization plan aimed at increasing efficiency. Two weeks later,
it was abandoned and the reassigned men returned to their previous jobs.
According to Wright, morale in the department had never been higher.
The police are also watching the outcome of the firefighters case
closely. Should they win their case with the Civil Service, and regain
their lost members without a cut in pay, "trouble at Town Hall" from the
police will ensue.
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The Firefighters And Their Union
The 74 firefighters of Belmont are divided among three fire sta-
tions "strategically located" about the town. The largest station,
where Fire Chief and union president are headquartered, is down the
hill from the Town Hall and Police Station. The station was completely
renovated in 1979. The number of firefighters has increased from 68
to 74 between 1966 and 1980, a reflection of a reduction in hours per
week from 56 in 1966 to 42 in 1974. During the 1970's,
the number of ranking personnel was increased so that each piece of
apparatus is headed by an officer; there are currently four deputy
fire chiefs, three captains, thirteen lieutenants, and 54 firefighters,
plus the support staff. The duties of the fire department are generally
shared among the men; in contrast to the police, the various positions
do not vary substantially in nature of work -- fires are fought as a
team, and in the absence of calls, firefighters are on duty at the
station.
Since 1972, the union contract has included a minimum manning
clause, both per shift and per piece of equipment. A Table of Organiza-
tion was introduced at the same time, listing the number of officers
and firefighters per engine company. Both minimum manning and the
table of organization have been clauses which the town has attempted
to eliminate with each contract negotiation, never successfully.
Base wage for a firefighter is roughly $16,700.00; generally, the
differentials between night shift/day shift, new and older employees,
are considerably smaller than in the Police Department.
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The firefighters union, Local 1637 of the IAFF, AFL-CIO, representing
all firefighters except the Chief, is commonly accepted as the strongest
trade union in the town. The union history of the department began
back in the 1940's when a form of union was created. After a few years
of existence, it was dropped until 1966, when the Belmont firefighters
joined the International. The first contracts were oral agreements;
gains which had been made were finally formalized in the first written
contract signed in 1972. Rosario Sacco, ex-member of the teamsters
and current member of the executive board of the Professional Firefighters
of Massachusetts (the statewide organization of the IAFF), has been the
local's president for ten years since the push of the younger men formed
the current union. In his eyes, the benefits of unionization have been
primarily the increased benefits -- holidays, personal days, vacation
scheduling (the coincidence of the primary vacation period with the
public schools' summer vacation) -- and the "unity of the membership."
It was the latter which he feels sold the union to the employees.
Jonathan Hiatt, labor attorney, was hired by the union in 1974 and has
remained the local's legal representative since.
The passage of Proposition 2 was as much a surprise to the fire-
fighters as the other town employees. The spring negotiations over
the 1980-82 contract were relatively uneventful and the contract was
signed by the end of the summer. The town attempted, as usual, to
remove the minimum manning clauses and failed. A paragraph was added
to the town's rights clause, the importance of which is in dispute.
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Crowe believes the new language provides the same management leeway
as with the police, despite the different wording; Hiatt believes the
paragraph did nothing to alter the previous intent.
The strategy and tactics of the firefighters local in response to
the passage of Proposition 2 and the Selectmen's "Axe" differed
considerably from that of the police, as did the outcome. The union
voted to reject the town's last offer in January. On February 1,
eight firefighters were laid off, though five of which have since been
ordered reinstated by the Civil Service Commission.
There are several differences between the firefighters and police
in their status which have considerable relevance to the nature of the
negotiations following the passage of Proposition 2 . For one, the
management "right to discharge for lack of work or other legitimate
reasons" found in the police union contracts is missing from the
firefighters. There is also a minimum manning per shift and per vehicle
clause in the contract and a table of organization -- no such provisions
cover the police. Five of the eight firefighters slated to be laid off
had Civil Service tenure, and thus had rights to hearing before the town
and appeal to the Commission, during which the town has to demonstrate
the necessity of layoffs for reasons of lack of work or lack of money.
The firefighters have only one local, and leadership remained
stable not only during the negotiations but had been centralized in
the hands of Sacco for considerable time. The strength of the fire-
fighters union was also perceived to be greater than that of the police,
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which Sacco attributes to their affiliation with the IAFF and PFM,
the cohesion of the numbers (team spirit), and the history of strong
unionism. There is also a difference in tone of relations with manage-
ment, at least from the town's perspective. Though the employees
generally feel that the firefighters and police have made roughly the
same gains since unionization (except in the 1974 larger wage increase
and the inclusion of minimum manning), town officials perceive the
firefighters as better off, and there is perhaps less sympathy for the
firefighters in their economic status than for the police. The union
feels, however, that relations have generally been good with the Select-
men, and they have never arbitrated a grievance prior to this year,
though such action has occurred in contract negotiation. The course of
events which led to a different outcome from that of the police was
influenced considerably by these factors and their implications for
union power.
The story of the firefighters begins in a similar vein with that
of the police, a challenge to the management right to layoff. John Hiatt
responded to Robert Crowe's letter of November 19 notifying Local
1637 that layoffs were being contemplated in much the same way as Downs
had for the police. Hiatt's letter, sent five days later than Downs',
stated the Union's desire to negotiate not only over impact but also
the decision to reduce level of services or effectuate layoffs. He
stressed that the union did not waive the right to claim that any of the
proposed changes were proscribed by the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. Crowe's response was the invitation to the informational
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meeting of December 10. At that meeting, Hiatt requested that the
union be given the opportunity to be part of the Selectmen's decision-
making process which was to occur in the ensuing two weeks and for the
union to have "the right to negotiate on the question of whether layoffs
will result before the decision is made." Hiatt claims that Crowe
rejected such request, stating the Town would only discuss the impact
of layoffs. A letter from Hiatt to Crowe followed the next day,
reiterating the union's position that it had a right to bargain over
the decision, and also requesting financial information. No official
contact between the union and town occurred until January 8, 1981.
Crowe met with Hiatt and Sacco on the 8th and presented the town's
list of proposed cuts. The fire department was to suffer the layoff
of eight firefighters; the ambulance was to be transferred from the
police so that further personnel layoffs would not have to be made.
The five Civil Service tenured firefighters were the only ones with
such status to be slated for layoff in the town. Crowe, Hiatt and Sacco
set up a meeting for January 19th to begin bargaining.
The Belmont Citizen reported "plummeting morale" in the fire
department following the announcement of impending layoffs. Considerable
questioning of fiscal need for the layoffs was registered: "they
want to know why they were the first in the state to be layed off,"
"Belmont has surplus funds but it was the first to react (to Proposition
2 ," "I didn't think Belmont was that bad off." Many of the firefighters
slated for layoff had family tradition of firefighting, and had believed
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the job tobe "secure, as well as rewarding." A captain expressed the
opinion that those to be dismissed represented "the backbone of the
department," that the department required a mix of youth and experience,
which would be lost as those to be laid off were primarily young. The
union response was not as yet determined, according to Sacco, though
legal action was being considered.3 5
The impact of the layoffs would not have the same effect on the
organization of the department as it would in the police case. As
there were not different divisions in the department, the membership
was generally a single pool, drawn out at specific instances to answer
calls. The layoffs would affect the overall safety of the department
personnel (or so it was claimed) in lessening the pool available for
back-up, but specific jobs were not to be altered.
Chief Murphy declined comment on the layoffs and the potential
impact on the remaining personnel. Management in general maintained
the same stance as with the police; the layoffs would not affect the
quality of service or the safety of the town.
The police had by this time begun their media campaign to enlist
the support of town residents against the layoffs. The fire department
did not seek out such publicization, though once in Belmont, they
willingly responded to reporters' requests for interviews and helped in
the leaflet drops. Sacco has stated that he does not believe in "trial
by press," nor does he like sensationalism. The support of the town
3 5Belmont Citizen, January 15, 1981.
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was not an irrelevant consideration for the firefighters, however, and
it has been said that the union would go to town if further cuts,
particularly the closing of a fire station, were attempted. The issue
of the town's safety was the primary thrust of the media campaign, as
well as the injustice to the members laid off.
On the 19th, the town and Local 1637 met for what was supposed to
be the first bargaining session. Hiatt presented a letter to Crowe,
reiterating the union's position that the decision to reduce the level
of service, to effectuate layoffs and the impact were all mandatory
subjects of bargaining, and requested further information in order to
carry out bargaining responsibilities under Chapter 150E. In response
to Hiatt's expressed dissatisfaction with the pre-made decision, Crowe
informed Hiatt that the final decision had not yet been made vis a vis
the layoffs. Crowe agreed to provide further fiscal information, but
the scope of bargaining issue was not resolved. The town requested a
date for subsequent bargaining session; Hiatt responded that the union
was not prepared to set a date as it had to have time to review the
information it was to receive.
The town later accused Local 1637 of stalling, citing the events
at the above and subsequent meetings. Crowe believes that the union
strategy was to refuse to bargain over impact, in order to prevent
any "impact," i.e., the layoffs. The union defends itself by stating
that it has always requested and reviewed the town's financial documents
prior to negotiation, and that delays in setting bargaining dates were
due to circumstance, not strategy.
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The firefighters attended the Selectmen's meeting on January 19
as well as police personnel and 500 citizens. During the meeting, two
Cambridge firefighters, residents of Belmont, brought up the issue of
a threat to mutual aid contracts from possible layoffs. Mutual aid is
a reciprocal contract among towns whereby the fire department of one
town will come to the aid of that in another in case of need. Dusty
Alward, president of PFM, had indicated by way of the press that he
was considering prohibiting any local from coming to the aid of a
community where layoffs had been effected. Such a policy has not as
yet "come into" being, including in Belmont, but it has considerable
power as a threat. Should mutual aid contracts not be honored, severe
implications for town safety would emerge.
Hiatt and Crowe exchanged letters and a telephone call on January
20th. Crowe informed Hiatt of the intent to reach a decision by January
26th; Hiatt declared this unacceptable. Crowe wrote that the Town was
"disappointed in the union's refusal to bargain over impact" and that
the refusal to set a date and time for bargaining was evidence of a lack
of good faith bargaining. Hiatt refuted these charges, and questioned
Crowe's change of stance from the December 2 letter in which he had
offered to bargain over impact and alternatives to layoffs. On January
22, by phone, Hiatt and Crowe set up a meeting for the next day, in
response to the rumored proposal of a wage increase cut from the town to
the police.
In response to Flewelling's "challenge" to the unions to come up
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with ways to save the jobs, Sacco was quoted as saying "It was uncalled
for; we don't get paid to run the town. It's their job ... It was
unfair (to expect the union to be responsible for alternative proposals)." 3 6
At the meeting of January 23, the town indicated that it had re-
vised its estimates of the financial impact of 2 , stating that the
primary loss would be through excise tax revenues, not the overall
property tax limitation. The Town's plea of financial distress was
thus weakened. Crowe informed Hiatt and Sacco of the offer made to the
police, and made a similar proposal to Local 1637 -- reduce the negotiated
wage increase for FY 81 to 4 percent. Also requested was an extension
of the vacation schedule by two weeks on either end, meaning that some
firefighters would be on vacation while public schools were still in
session. This has major importance to the firefighters, and lessened
the attractiveness of the proposal considerably. Crowe was told that
the proposal would have to be brought to the union membership and could
not be voted on for three days. He responded for the town by saying
that the union had until the Selectmen's meeting on the 26th.
Crowe called Hiatt Monday afternoon prior to the Selectmen's meeting
and offered to set up another bargaining session on the 28th, but said
the town refused to postpone its decision. Crowe indicated that the
town would not only bargain over impact of layoffs but also alternatives.
Hiatt agreed to meet with Crowe, although he expressed concern that any
bargaining would be meaningless after the Selectmen had already voted.
3 6Belmont Citizen, January 22, 1981.
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The town's proposal was taken to the full union membership on
Tuesday, the 27th, following the Selectmen's meeting of the 26th where
the vote to implement layoffs had been made. The Selectmen had made
it clear that they were not bluffing. One firefighter, the most senior,
was not to be discharged until March 20, as he was currently absent.
Sacco had made his opinion of the proposal clear -- it was unfair, but
the membership had to be the ones to decide. The vote was unanimous
to table the proposal. According to Sacco, "the union membership
didn't want to interfere with the contract." The union also had a
number of options still available. A meeting with Crowe had already
been arranged for the next day, during which alternative proposals
could be offered. Though a hearing had been held in the town under
Civil Service regulation over the layoff of the firefighters and a
decision made in favor of management "just cause," there remained a
right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission itself, a body outside
of Belmont.
At the meeting, held on the 28th, Hiatt reiterated his concern that
bargaining was fruitless after the fact. However, the town requested
the union's proposals of means by which to cover the fire department's
share of revenue shortfall ($52,000.00) and six were presented: (1)
appropriation of $52,000.00 from the Town's free cash; (2) appropriation
of the same amount from the reserve fund; (3) use of anticipated monies
unexpended by June 30, based on proportion of expended monies as of
December 31, 1980 (i.e., the appropriated budget exceeded the amount spent);
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(4) fees to be assessed for certain specified services provided by the
fire department which had historically been free (ambulance, lock outs);
(5) lump sum payments to be offered as incentives for early retirement
for firefighters; (6) submission of the underlying dispute to binding
interest arbitration. The town rejected all proposals, except the
early retirement incentive, on which they requested specific data. Hiatt
responded that the membership would have to be polled to determine the
exact number of employees who would be induced to retire; the town then
retracted any interest in the idea and declared the proposal invalid.
Crowe declared the parties to be at impasse. Hiatt said he had another
proposal, that a study committee comprised of fiscal experts be formed
to seek solutions. This also was rejected and the meeting was adjourned.
The police meanwhile took their second vote on the proposal, and
with the help of the superior officers, accepted the wage increase cut.
The Selectmen contacted the firefighters after the police vote and
re-offered the proposal. A meeting of the membership was called.
According to Sacco, who claims to have stepped aside and let the
membership decide the issue, five of the seven firefighters to be laid
off stood up at the meeting and told the membership not to open the
contract, that their jobs would not be worth returning to if the terms
were renegotiated. The membership, in response to the five firefighters
slated to be laid off, voted unanimously against the proposal.
The lack of-true financial need justifying the layoffs was stated
as a critical point. The firefighters had calculated the cost of lay-
offs that would be incurred, which considerably reduced the savings to
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the town. Unemployment compensation (which the town pays directly,
having a pay-as-you-go policy) and the payment of overtime, which would
be incurred in order to maintain the minimum manning per shift as
stipulated in the contract, would reduce the savings to less than
half. This argument was in fact the key one used in the Civil Service
hearings. Sacco questioned financial need if the town could afford to
pay the full police membership through June 30, as the savings from the
wage cut would not be realized until FY 81. Considerable anger was
registered over the Selectmen's decision in fact of surplus monies.
Sacco did indicate that perhaps if Belmont had been in the same fiscal
straights as Somerville or Chelsea (both towns under severe fiscal
impact from the bill), the "story might have been different."3 7
In a later interview, Sacco reiterated the importance of the vacation
schedule change, and stated that perhaps if the town's proposal had
been only a wage cut, it might have gone through.
Various other reasons have been offered for the decision. Both
Hiatt and Sacco mentioned the strong union history of the department
and the fact that good trade unionism required leaving the contract
unopened. This was and remains the statewide policy of the PFM.
Taking the wage increase cut was also viewed as subsidizing the
residents, the union employees taking the burden of 2 . Hiatt had at
one point asked the Selectmen if they would give up 4 percent of their
private sector income to cover the revenue loss. The union was also
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3 7Roy Sacco, March 1981.
suspicious that if a cut was taken, they would never regain what was
lost. As one firefighter slated to be laid off said, "We feel that
the union has fought hard to get where they are. Start giving up things
now and you never know what could happen next year." All were the
same issues facing the police, but because of a stronger "union"
policy and perspective pushed by Hiatt and Sacco, had more impact.
Sacco believes that the firefighters are closer, having more camaraderie
than the police, particularly as there is only one union, and are better
unionists in general. It should also be remembered that leadership
was very much in the hands of Sacco, who found conflict with the proposal
and good unionism. Hiatt, also believing in not opening the contract,
had been the local's attorney for a long time and delivered considerable
benefits to the membership.
As previously mentioned, relative to what would have happened in
the police department, little rearrangement of personnel occurred due
to firefighter layoffs. Minimum manning was not affected, as any
deficiencies are made up through overtime, thus safety was not directly
affected. The nature of the work and lack of variety in types of jobs
meant that no personal interests, such as a stake in a special position,
were threatened.
The legal apparatus was set in motion following the first vote of
the local, taking similar form to that begun by Downs for the police
(which were all withdrawn with the police settlement). Greater hope
for favorable decisions was evident, however, due to the language of
130
the contract and to the Civil Service tenure status of most of the
firefighters. A grievance against contract was filed with Chief Murphy
alleging violations of the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
Chief Murphy found the grievance justified on the ground that the
layoffs violated the preamble as well as the Table of Organization,
compensation plans, and the work schedule (minimum manning). The grie-
vance is currently with the Selectmen and about to go into arbitration.
A complaint of prohibitive practice was filed with the Massachusetts
Labor Relations Commission on January 29. The union claimed that the
town had altered conditions of employment when it announced layoffs
on January 6th and had not provided the union with the opportunity to
bargain on issues involving the determination of reduction of services
(essentially using the legal theory that the scope of mandatory bargaining
included the decision as well as impact). The charge also called the
town for engaging in surface bargaining. The complaint was dismissed
by the MLRC on March 11 with the following justifications: the town had
given sufficient opportunity to bargain over its proposed layoff plan;
that it had demonstrated willingness to bargain over alternatives as
well as impact; that the town did not have the legal obligation to bargain
over transfers of funds; and that no evidence of bad faith bargaining
was evident on the part of the town. The affidavits from the town
had all claimed that the union had stalled the negotiations, and had
shown bad faith bargaining in their insistence on bargaining over the
decision. Sacco viewed the finding as a refutation of the right of the
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union to have input in decisions of the town. He also admitted that,
indeed, he had not felt that they did have such right over "management"
policy but had agreed to file the complaint anyway. The union behavior
is thus even more clearly a matter of response, than of action.
The main thrust and power of the legal strategy was with the Civil
Service Commission. Hiatt appealed the decision of the Town's hearing
officer (finding "just cause" for the layoffs) to the full Commission,
using the argument that the town had not shown lack of funds or lack of
work, the two conditions necessary for layoffs under Civil Service
regulations. The Commission ruled for the union on March 26, and ordered
the firefighters reinstated. Its finding was that the town, rather
than "suffering from any 'lack of money,' had ample money, but simply
choose not to expend it." The net savings from the layoff of the five
tenured employees (including unemployment compensation and overtime
costs) would only amount to $13,000.00, a figure which could be covered
by the interest accrued on the Reserve Fund. "Meeting shortfalls in
revenue is a legitimate and proper use of reserve fund monies." The
town was considerably distressed over the finding, seeing a breach of
home rule rights in the determination that reserve funds had to be used.
Crowe has appealed the decision, and the firefighters were not immediately
reinstated. On April 16, the union sought a court order to force the
town to reinstate the men, and won.
An injunction against the town was also sought on January 30, but
it was turned down. Similarly, Hiatt has filed a case against the
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constitutionality of Proposition 2 with little success. He believes
that the courts will not act on the issue until lack of money is found
as a justification for layoffs, thereby interfering with collective
bargaining; federal law prohibits any state legislation from such inter-
ference.
The firefighters' union had therefore maintained the integrity of
their negotiated contract and still retained the majority of their
membership (the three non-tenured members are indeed without jobs). The
deciding issue as of this point in time was their access to an institution
outside the jurisdiction of collective bargaining, the Civil Service
Commission. The union lost a battle under the collective bargaining law --
the complaint of prohibitive practice. Their argument for the integrity
of the contract -- the grievance that the layoffs violated provisions
of the contract itself -- is as yet undetermined. The decision to
reject the town's proposal was, however, a decision made within the
context of unionism, and has received the support of the majority of
unions around the state.
The fire personnel have retained their positions, and their vacation
schedule and wage increase is intact. Morale in the department is
repu ted to be up, particularly after the Civil Service Commission's
ruling. Relations with the town have suffered somewhat, particularly
because of the police decision, and it is unclear what the impact of
the current decision will have on future relations with management,
or what will happen after July 1.
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CHAPTER III. BELMONT AND THE EMPLOYMENT/WAGE TRADE-OFF
What happened in Belmont
In response to the question of what had happened in Belmont during
January, patrolmen's union president Eagan responded that the police mem-
bership had acted out of humanitarian consideration for the junior patrol-
men and concern for the safety of police officers and the town in taking
the town's last proposal. Roy Sacco, president of the firefighters local
responded that it was not the duty of public employees to subsidize the.
citizens of the town and state and that good trade unionism mandated that
a negotiated contract not be opened up. In reality, the outcome of the
imposed trade-off between wage increases and employment levels was not so
easily derived, but rather involved a major portion of the labor relations
system. Incorporated in the final outcome were the complex relationships
among economic, political, and technological contexts and the organization
power resources, and objectives of the two unions.
The trade-off between employment and wages imposed in Belmont does
not fit in the classic economic model operating in the private sector which
Dunlop described. There, the decision between the two options, a wage re-
duction or unemployment, would have been partially determined by the degree
of competitiveness of labor (police and fire personnel), product (the pub-
lic safety services), and employer, and the relative advantage that each
factor had in the broader market. The unions, if able to obtain with cer-
tainty, all relevant economic information concerning the long term competi-
tiveness of their labor and the product, would have determined which option
1 John Dunlop, Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, New York: Augustus M.
Kelley, Inc. 1950.
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maximized a particular goal of the members and leaders. The outcome between
fire and police would have varied with the relative magnitudes of factors
in Dunlop's model as well as the particularities of union definition of
membership and nature of its objectives.
Instead, in Belmont, neither the appropriate information was attain-
able nor were decisions of ultimate trade-offs between employment and wages
under market control. The nature of the constraint on municipal revenues
was essentially political, as was the peculiar budget constraint which each
union faced (there is no indication that the means by which the Selectmen
opted to trim the budget were other than political, though a concern with
productivity--unmeasurable--was evident). Uncertainty over the duration of
the revenue constraint was high and the nature of ultimate impacts of wages
level was indeterminate. It was clear that neither union had expected the
passage of Proposition 2 and both believed that some action (either by the
town or the state) would alter the current situation. The fiscal health
of Belmont was not in jeopardy. The impacts of Proposition 2 were mini-
mal, relative to other towns in the metropolitan area, of which both unions
were accutely aware. No danger of default or any severe economic constraint
was in the foreseeable future.
Police and fire both faced the same relative competitiveness for their
jobs in terms of other employees, 'substitution of private sector employees
was equally unlikely (contracting of police and fire services is rarely, if
ever, a municipal option), personnel versus total costs were equal in both,
and the demand, at least in terms of that discernible from public voice in
the media and at town meetings, was equal. Neither the future demand for
their services, nor the employment levels required for those services could
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be determined. Both unions faced equal and insurmountable uncertainty as
to their real economic power and context.
The trade-off was imposed by management; neither union had offered
a reduction in base pay as an alternative to layoffs during the negotiations.
It was direct and immediate, and pre-calculated, though future trade-offs
were not. It is therefore possible that a very simple economic calculation
could have been performed for wage bill maximization or other such economic
goal for the five months before new conditions would reign. There is no
indication that this was done by either union, or even considered as a
possible means of determining outcome. It is also relevant that the pro-
posals did not have just economic impacts; formal (vacation schedules) and
informal (job position) benefits were integral parts of the trade-offs and
could not be calculated by mathematical formulation.
As the decision to impose a trade-off was not based on laws of supply
and demand, and neither were the limits of the choice, unions decisions be-
tween the two alternatives had to lie in factors other than those which
Dunlop predicted to be relevant. The Selectmens decision had been essen-
tially political, placing the trade-off issue firmly in the political pro-
cess.
The political context, both within the town and in the state (with
the elimination of binding arbitration) had shifted the distribution of
power more towards management, which inspired greater struggle for control.
The behavior of management in its relations with the unions was altered by
Proposition 2 (and to some extent, prior to November with -the hiring of
Bob Crowe). From both union and management perspectives, the negotiations
were heavily tainted with struggles for power. The Selectmen had perceived
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a shift in power away from the unions with the passage of 2 and the intro-
duction of stronger management rights' clauses in the police and fire con-
tracts and "friendly relations" were no longer necessary for attainment of
objectives. The objectives of management were also more clearly defined
as control not only over the fiscal but the functional operations of the
towns. It was also relevant that in Belmont, the Selectmen, chose to con-
duct budget revisions behind closed doors, asserting their autonomy from
the political process and closing the door to multilateral bargaining.
The unions were aware of a power struggle; the choice of layoffs in
the strongest unions without real financial justification was not believed
to be a coincidence. It is also relevant to both unions and management
that the proposed layoffs were the first in the state under 2 . In gener-
al, relations between town and police and fire were of the same quality.
There is some indication that those with the police were more cordial, and
less 'hostility' toward the police is evident in Town Hall. The order in
which unions were approached with the offer of a wage cut is not coincident-
al. The Selectmen and Crowe were aware of the stronger history and current
trade unionism of the firefighters.
None of the above serves to explain why the police and fire unions
arrived at different conclusions. The economic conditions facing the unions
were predominately equal; the differences in relationship with management
were not sufficiently significant to be the explanatory variable. The
trade-off decision was to be conducted in a setting of power struggle,
and the political resources of the two unions were considerably different.
Both police and fire locals are affiliated with state and national
organizations. Because of considerable local autonomy, neither derived con-
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siderable power in the immediate situation from the affiliation, though in-
fluence was evident, particularly for the firefighters. The MPF and IAFF
are recognized as powerful organizations, more so than the IBPO; both are
more active at the state level, lobbying for legislation, and currently for
state aid to municipalities, than locally. Both took strong positions
against reopening contracts. Influence from the IBOP to the police unions
was carried through their attorney, David Downs. The pressure to conform
to state policy was not large, however; Downs informed the local that the
IBPO would support whichever decision they made. For the firefighters,
there was a personal connection with the MPF through Sacco's membership on
the executive board, and it is probable that he was susceptible to pressure
to conform to statewide policy. The NPF is also more feared on the state
level, and has had considerable success in obtaining favorable legislation
and decisions in the courts. More legal and political power was therefore
derived from the affiliation for the firefighters than for the police.
The public was also utilized as a source of political power, as indi-
cated by the media campaign, both in Belmont and in the metropolitan area,
and the leaflett drop. Differences in support from residents between fire
and police did not seem evident; it was generally clear that residents de-
sired the maintenance of service levels in both. It was also obvious to
both unions that public support would change with the outcome of the trade-
off, which the police hope to utilize in the next round of layoffs, should
it arise. The influence on the Selectmen of public support for the employees
in eliminating the trade-off was evidently not considerable however, it did
serve to reinforce "public spirit" attitudes in the membership and mitigate
some of the lost 'dignity' from the vote on Proposition 2 . Both union
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leaders continue to believe that the public desires the same level of ser-
vice, and voted for the bill through ignorance and property tax revolt,
rather than as an attack on the union employees.
It might be noted that management may have been affected by public
support for the employees in altering their initial stance and proposing
the trade-off. Likewise, other institutional considerations, such as those
suggested by Reder2 and O'Connor may have played a role. It is conceivable
that the degree of public and union opposition were sufficiently threatening
to favorability of the public to the Selectmen that they found a means of
containing such conflict, by, in part, putting focus on the unions, rather
than themselves, through proposing the alternative to layoffs. The fire-
fighters were to bear the brunt of the Selectmen's decision in lost support
from the public. The time for union access to such influence had passed
with the imposition of the trade-off the Selectmen were not induced to re-
move it. It was probably as clear to the Selectmen as to the unions that
strikes or other militant action would not occur, and thus the town offic-
ials never really risked public peace.
There were differences in access to legal and institutional structures
relevant to public employment. In general, the firefighters had considerably
more access to the legal system as a source of security for jobs. Most
critical was that power embodied through the Civil Service Commission, the
2Melvin Reder, "The Theory of Employment and Wages in the Public Sector",
in Danieal Hamermesh, ed. Labor into Public and Non-Profit Sector.
3James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State.
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greatest power perceived by Sacco. The police, due to the lack of tenure
of the patrolmen slated for layoff, did not have equal access. The differ-
ences in the management rights clauses, less clearly defined for the fire-
fighters, and more importantly, the manning clause included in the fire but
not in the police contracts, also increased the ability of the firefighters
to resolve the dilemna outside of bargaining.
The above sources of power were used in the attempt to eliminate the
imposed trade-off. The legal system, the contracts themselves, public sup-
port, were all utilized to attempt to remove the issue, with different suc-
cess. State lobbying through the affiliates can also be viewed as the at-
tempt to eliminate the financial constraint. The strategy of both Downs and
Hiatt was to demand to discuss the decision to layoff, rather than the exact
terms of a trade-off. The failure of the police to avoid the trade-off.
The failure of the police to avoid the trade-off certainly had an impact on
the decision to accept the proposal. This in itself does not fully explain
their action, relative to the firefighters or other unions in the state.
Downs still had three petitions pending a hearing at the time of the injun-
ction request was dismissed. That no one had much faith in a favorable de-
cision--and that the union president at the time had come to believe that
indeed, one of them, the grievance under contract for failure to bargain
over the decision to layoff, was illegitimate--exacerbated the constraints
the patrolmen were facing. It does not bear on the superior officer's agree-
ment to share in the wage cut. The firefighters at the time of the police
decision had greater access to the legal machinery that might enforce secur-
ity of the jobs, but the outcome of the petitions were by no means certain.
Sacco had as little faith as Wright in both the legitimacy and the viability
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of the grievance petition. Civil Service was the major hope, but it should
be remembered that the hearing held at the local level had ruled that the
town did have just cause for layoff of of tenured personnel. The risk was
better for firefighters but not sufficiently so to warrant a conclusion
that the difference in decision lay solely in the access to the legal sys-
tem.
There is insufficient evidence that any of these external sources of
power or influences on union objectives were the determinate of the outcome
in the trade-off offered by the Selectmen. Certainly the economic factors
were irrelevant to the context of the case, as the power of the unions did
not lie in their competitive status, nor that of managements. Other factors
were roughly equal between the town unions and thus do not in themselves ex-
plain the variation in outcome. The firefighters were seen to have greater
access to power through the legal system and their statewide affiliation.
The uncertainty of the former, and questionable influence of the latter, ren-
der these factors as lacking in potential for determination of outcome.
Particularly in light of Sacco's perception of the situation, these factors
seem less than totally convincing in explaining the firefighters rejection
of the proposal. More importantly, the relative absence of these sources
of power do not fully explain why the police deviated so widely from their
own tradition and that of the firefighters. The explanatory power for the
different outcomes between police and fire unions lies in the unions as or-
ganizations--their histories, multiple actors and interests, and that in
turn, it is hypothesized, is partially determined by the nature of the work
and organization of the workplace (the technical context, according to Dun-
lop). Closer examination of the internal dynamics of the two unions is re-
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quired.
In some respects, police and fire unions were quite similar. No threat
of rival unions was evident, nor of non-union workers being utilized. Nei-
ther union was facing a loss of membership of a magnitude which would in it-
self affect the viability of the union. Relative to other unions in the
town, the membership of police and fire were both more cohesive and exhibited
greater "public spirit". Apart from those factors, internal organization
and nature of jobs were significantly different.
The history of the police union is shorter than that of the firefighters,
the origins of the bargaining unit beginning in 1970, rather than in the
1960's. Traditionally the police union was weaker relative to the fire-
fighter, and if any patterns were followed, it was the police following the
firefighters. Leadership role has not been as dominant among the police; it
is the policy of both locals to rotate the presidency. During the cutback
negotiations, three different presidents led the patrolmen's local, with ob-
vious differences in attitude. The role of Shea as the superior officer's
president but incoming Police Chief calls into question his values as union-
ist versus management in leading the bargaining. Downs was also new to the
unions and did not have a history with the locals.
The police department is represented by two locals who bargain separ-
ately, though usually with the same negotiator and similar outcomes. The
membership is divided through this separation but also in the organization
of the department. There are a number of different divisions--detective,
traffic, juvenile--whose jobs differ from the patrolmen's, and are generally
thought to be more "cushy" in terms of routine, endangerment of life, and
visibility to the public. The magnitude of payment differentials is much
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higher than that in the fire department, between night and day shifts,
among ranks, and between new hires and more senior personnel. Though all
police personnel are based in the same building, and as a group share the
similar socialization process on the job and from training, the work of the
patrolmen, the majority of the officers, entails certain particular charact-
eristics which set it apart both from other police jobs and from that of
the firefighters.
The nature of police work has been the source of numerous works, which
illuminate it special characteristics. Lipsky most recently has looked at
the nature of the job as part of "street-level bureaucracy". Important
characteristics include the critical role of the partnership for the patrol-
men. Work is carried out away from the body of the personnel department,
either alone or with a permanent partner. Contact with the public is con-
siderable, and most importantly, carried out on a personal level away from
supervision and group support. This "workplace" organization permits con-
siderable discretion in policy, as does the difficulty of definition of ob-
jectives and their achievement. More important to this argument is the
fact that the patrolmen do not operate as group, though personal relation-
ships are critical, they are more between partners than between all members.
The safety of a patrolman in times of danger depends not so much on the
resources of the entire department, but, on the back-up from the partner or
a few other officers. Despite the dramatics of the infrequent dangerous en-
counter, particularly rare in the quiet town of Belmont, the majority of the
4Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy.
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work is routine and somewhat boring. In response, the routine which a pol-
ice officer develops and his personal method of carrying out duties becomes
critically important. The end result is considerable attachment to the prop-
erties of a particular job, both for patrolmen and in the other divisions,
and a sense of the importance of individual, rather than group relationships.
Public support is also more critical to the effective carrying out of the
police mandate.
The purpose of police work has also had particular significance for
the history of unionism. Because the police are charged with maintenance
of law and order (social peace), tolerance by the public and government for
unionization was much harder to come by. Employees themselves are put in a
contradictory position, whereby militant or aggressive action is difficult
to justify, when in their normal duties, police must contain such actions.
There is some evidence that the "public spirit" motives of recruits are
stronger than in the firefighters. All serve to create internal conflicts
between the police officer as a public servant and as an employee.
In contrast, the firefighters local is older, more connected with a
strong trade union history. There is a single unit for all personnel which
has been dominated by the single leadership of Roy Sacco, a strong unionist
by history and value. Legal representation had been provided by the same
person, an attorney, whereas the police had used a negotiator only, until
1980. There are fewer divisions among the personnel in the department.
Though there are three stations, thus splitting the body up geographically,
within each station work is carried out as a team. Differentials in pay
are considerably lower than in the police in all categories. The safety of
firefighters during periods of endangerment is conditioned on numbers, rather
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than individual back-up; the firefighters face danger, and the public, as
a group.
The work is also considerably different. The range of duties is much
smaller. More importantly, daily work is carried out at the station, away
from visibility of the public. Though there is considerable idle time, that
time can be spent among fellow workers and is less restricted as to its na-
ture. Personal definition of the duties of the job are much less common.
In sum, the firefighters relate to each as a group, susceptibility to pub-
lic and its support is considerably less, and the jobs are not endowed with
personal properties as with patrolmen.
The firefighters have faced much less resistance in the attempts to
organize, both from membership and from the public. Their purpose is not
so critically related to public order, and thus militant action is not a
contradiction with the nature of the work. The long history of firefighting
unionism has also meant that the distinctions between public servant and
employee have not been so hard to make.
The sum of all this has dual significance in the case. The organiza-
tion of the union--its history, and the relationship of its members to the
workplace, for one, affect the degree of cohesion and solidarity; the great-
er the sense of group membership, and the less this conflicts with perceived
purpose of work, the greater the concept of unionism over its membership,
and thus the greater influence over others. For another, the trade-off of-
fered the police and fire unions meant different things to each. The loss
of eight patrolmen to the union membership had considerable more impact than
that to the firefighters. According to Shea's reorganization plan, twenty-
three officers were to be affected by the layoffs. Officers in detective
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and juvenile services were to be transferred back into uniforms and onto
the street, and because they had seniority, men on the day shift were bumped
to night. This disrupted not only partnerships, but by nature of the per-
sonal properties with which jobs were endowed, the officers' relationship
to his work. It is significant that Shea implemented a reorganization of
the department after the cutback negotiations, but it was eliminated within
two weeks and officers returned to their original duties. The trade-off
that was perceived by the police membership was not so much a choice of wage
versus employment, but wage versus security of position.
The impact of layoff in the fire department was limited almost entire-
ly to the men themselves. No reorganization was to be affected by their
loss, and no change in the properties of the job critical-to its desirability.
Though some loss of safety from smaller numbers might have been evident, the
affect of this was insignificant relative to the total number of personnel.
Though social relationships were to be affected, a threat to the critical
partnership relationship was not relevant. What was important was that not
only did the town's final offer include a wage reductibn, but a reorganiza-
tion of the vacation 'schedule. The schedule was of considerable importance
to the membership and one of the major benefits won by the union. The trade-
off facing the firefighters was between benefits and wages and employment,
the benefit component being more critical than the employment.
Thus the town's offer of an alternative to layoffs stimulated a differ-
ent response from police and firefighters because of differences in power
from external forces, but from the membership itself, and in the alterna-
tive perceptions of what the trade-off really was. Not only did the pro-
posal call into question the nature of work to police and firefighters, but
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also the relationship of the union to the membership. What emerged during
the cutback negotiations was the existence of a concept of union with its
own interest, separate from the membership, despite the fact that the per-
sonnel component were one and the same.
Because the firefighters had access to legal recourse protecting job
security, a trade-off never fully emerged between wages and employment in
the bargaining context. The union provided its membership with this re-
source, and though its ultimate effectiveness was uncertain, the union had
been successful in the past in not only obtaining wage gains, but also crit-
ical benefits and job security through the minimum manning clause. Further-
more, the state-wide union organization provided lobbying power with the
hope that state aid would eliminate the need for trade-offs. The union
bettered the risk that the local was taking in opting to reject the proposal.
Chances were better for favorable ruling from the courts, and because of
the locals historic power in bargaining, loss of cooperative relationships
with management was not an undue threat (the firefighters had willingly
threatened this relationship at least three times previously in seeking out-
side intervention in collective bargaining impasses).
The stakes were also considerably lower due to lesser impact of lay-
offs on the remaining membership, a factor rising out of the fundamental
characteristics of firefighting jobs. The loss of the vacation benefit also
paralelled the union interest. It had been won through bargaining and it
was a useful instrument in rallying support for rejection of the proposal.
Group cohesiveness was not threatened either; the firefighters slated to be
laid off had supported the union and not asked for reprieve from the member-
ship at large. In essence, the interests of the union and the membership
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were not in conflict and no challenge to allegiance emerged. The tradition-
al call of solidarity and good unionism could be used to support the member-
ships' individual interests. The reaction by other unions outside of Bel-
mont in support of the firefighters helped to mitigate whatever ill feelings
were issuing from town residents. That the firefighter rarely confronts
the citizen except as a group helped maintain solidarity.
The police formally rejected the union with the consciousness that in
opting to open- the contract, they were going against the tide of unionism.
In actuality, the lack of power behind the union forced its objectives to
be different, and though "unionism" was rejected, the viability of the local
as representative of the police personnel was upheld. The union did not
provide adequate political or legal power to eliminate the need for a trade-
off. Neither in the courts or at the bargaining table was it perceived that
the union could win in the immediate situation or in the long run (the fail-
ure of the police union to win a larger wage increase than the firefighters
was the 180-82 contract negotiations was a recent memory). Once the union
had lost the initial battle (to eliminate the constraint), its interests
had to become subserviant to those of the membership, and it was there that
the concept of "unionism" conflicted with the memberships concept of work.
What the police wanted was not just job security but preservation of indiv-
idual positions and only through preservation of the former could the union
serve the strongest interests of the membership at large. The objectives
of the union had to be altered in order to preserve its viability. Inter-
nal dissension both from the officers to be laid off and from other members,
would not only result in rejection of the formal concept of unions, but also
in the viability of a union at all.
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In the face of no alternative, the police union opted to accept the
proposal which not only restored group cohesion (and thus union viability
and power) but also offered another source of political power. In absence
of other influence, unions gains were more likely to be made through cooper-
ative relationships with the Selectmen. It is openly admitted that the
police expect better treatment than the firefighters in the next negotiations.
and preservation of job security through such cordiality. The police also
enhanced their position relative to the public, as witnessed in numerous
editorials in the local papers applauding the police union action. Not only
was this increased political leverage, but it was also important to the
daily work of the patrolman. Public support and cooperation with management
in general are higher priorities for the police because of the interrela-
tionship between police and citizens in the maintenance of public peace.
In essence, then, the union took the rational choice which preserved its
viability with the membership and within the town.
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Belmont and Labor Relations Theory
A variety of different factors emerged out of the Belmont case, not
the least of which questions the existence of a trade-off and if so, be-
tween what. Before attempting to relate what happened to what might have
been predicted through the literature of public and private labor relations,
and to synthesize the conclusions to be drawn out of the case, it is import-
ant to note a few key conditions which make the Belmont trade-off different
not only from other experiences which Massachusetts towns and cities might
have, but also from a general context of economic constraint.
Perhaps the most obvious is the lack of real constraint in Belmont.
The impacts of Proposition 2 were minimal on municipal revenues, both in
the immediate and the predicted long run. The magnitude of the wage reduc-
tion and the layoffs was therefore not extremely large, certainly compared
to those in New York City, for instance, but neither were they particularly
necessary. The trade-off was also specifically imposed by management, and
required the reopening of a negotiated contract. The political ramifica-
tions were thus increased. These peculiarities of the Belmont case had sig-
nificance not only on the actors, but also in the potential for generaliz-
ing what happened there to other cities and conditions.
It has already been discussed that Dunlop's early economic behavior
of a rational union was irrelevant to the Belmont case. Not only did a
trade-off in this sense not exist (in absence of the competitive links be-
tween wage rates and employment levels), but the uncertainty under which the
constraint was imposed rendered such determination impossible. It is also
felt that Ross sufficiently identified the problems with the model to ques-
tion its validity even under the ideal conditions.
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In his own theory, Ross defined the union as an institution with its
own interests in survival. He placed primary responsibility for preserva-
tion of the union with the leadership. In the Belmont case, such a role is
not abundantly clear. Certainly the confusion of leadership in the patrol-
men's union (and the future Police Chief's role in the superior's) made a
dominance of leadership difficult. It can be seen that in each union, lead-
ership did strive to influence the membership, particularly Sacco in the
fire department, but there was a confusion in the case which makes identi-
fication of such a role more complicated--the difference between what the
unions themselves perceived as "good unionism" and maintenance of the integ-
rity of the union through its contract, and the actual survival of an entity
under which workers were organized. As was evident in the police union,
following the course of unionism might have meant the destruction of whatever
cohesion and bargaining advantage the union had. Had the trade-off not been
imposed in mid-contract, and thus required a challenge to a symbol of union
strength, such a confusion between concept and practicality might not have
arisen; however, Ross was perhaps unclear about what precisely a union was.
In his discussion of specific trade-off situations where wage reduc-
tions were being asked by the employer of the employee in return for main-
tenance (but level undetermined) of employment, Ross indicated that a wage
cut might be taken not to preserve employment, but the relationship with
management, as part of ensuring the survival of a union. Ross implies that
cooperation is generally beneficial, once the younger stages of union for-
mation have been passed. Cordial relations with management (and with the
public) were an outcome of the police decision, and perhaps an objective.
The firefighters were bound by no such goal, however, and it might be sur-
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mised that cooperation was only chosen by the police out of lack of alter-
native meand of influencing management, and even at that, only part of the
determining factors. Certainly cooperation (and public support) would aid
in the work of the police officer.
Ross was important in identifying the organizational component of
unions, the nature of the decision-making process as being a political pro-
cess of sorts, rather than the rational economic actor of Dunlop. He in-
dicated that membership and leadership preferences might not coincide or
necessarily be in the best interests of the union in light of management
and other pressures. The membership itself is not broken down (except by
employed and unemployed), however, and Ross offers little clue as to its
interests beyond the general income goals of higher wages and employment.
Thus; Ross would not have predicted that perhaps the greatest threat to
the police union rose out of an entirely non-economic interest.
The existence of trade-off in the general sense between employment
and wages was not denied by Ross; he merely stated that considerable inde-
terminateness lay in the relationship and it was irrelevant in the formula-
tion of union objectives. By skipping to the public labor relations liter-
ature, the issue of the existence of a trade-off at all is brought up. De-
spite a number of theorists who desired a replanting of public employment
wage and employment determinations into the private competitive market (pre-
sumably through lifting the strike prohibition), many still maintain that
such critical outcomes arise from the political process, not the economic.
There may be ultimate bounds through the limits to which a government can
and will tax its public; the importance to union behavior prior to the mid-
1970's was that such boundaries were not visible, placing the determination'
152
of wage and employment almost entirely in the political context. The source
of union power was therefore political, and the literature dealt primarily
with ways in which union and management worked to increase wages and employ-
ment at the same time. The issue of trade-offs between both was not real,
either in context or in formulation of union objectives.
The existence of fiscal constraint makes those upper bounds visible,
and alters the relationship between union and management. Increased costs
can no longer be passed onto the public and the institutional and political
reasons by which union and management could pursue the same ends are severely
restricted. The union, with a fixed municipal revenue, has to operate in
competition with other interests to determine the shape of constraint under
which it will be put. The process is still political, as balances of power
will determine the size of the constraint and whether trade-offs in the im-
mediate (not Dunlopian) sense will have to be made.
In Belmont, the first strategies of the unions were therefore predic-
table; they attempted to eliminate the presence of a trade-off. The liter-
ature had identified the means by which such could be done--the sources of
power and influence which a union might be able to utilize, primarily legal,
institutional (in terms of visible structures), affiliations, and different
interests within the local political context. The latter was not as influ-
ential as they had been previously, primarily because management perceived
a shift in the balance of power and attempted to centralize and contain the
political arena. The differences between the unions emerged in their differ-
access to external power, primarily the legal system.
When such efforts failed, however, in the case of the firefighters
at least in not removing all uncertainty, the public sector labor relations
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literature had little to offer in terms of how a union will cope with a
trade-off. Such trade-offs were not relevant for much of the history of
public employee unionization, the only theories that had developed about
the interests of such employees were seemingly invalidated with the press
for higher wages and the willingness to challenge the role as public ser-
vant. One then is seemingly forced to return to private sector literature
with its greater concern with the internal dynamics of unions in their con-
texts, at least since Ross.
Those theorists however, do not totally explain the different outcomes
between police and fire. Authors such as Shister had indicated that there
was a critical point beyond which unions would make cost concessions. Ross
had implied that such a point was where the viability of the union was threat-
ened. The magnitude of the layoffs did not in themselves pose such a threat,
and in the lack of rival unions (or comparison with other unions), the wage
reduction had less significance. Cooperative relations with management had
been significantly altered through a perceived shift in power, and the terms
under which management offered cooperation had great cost, at least to the
symbolic power of the unions. The pressure fromthe state and international
affiliations was not so much to not take a wage reduction, but not to open
the contract.
What seemed to emerge in the police situation was a conflict between
the interests of "unionism" and those of the membership. This distinction
is made by Ross in his institutional theory, but he does not provide ade-
quate indicationof where either interest is derived. It is only by looking
at a segment of Dunlop's framework (developed after his initial economic
model), which is frequently ignored, the technical context, and the history
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of public sector unions, that such motivations are explained and the real
trade-off defined. As was detailed in the previous section the nature of
police and firefighting work are different in the impacts on group solid-
arity. From the histories of the unions also emerge significant differences,
particularly in the resistance from society and from the membership in accep-
ting unionization. The nature of the work reveals that certain aspects are
particularly sensitive to pressure, in the police case, the organization of
the department in terms of job positions. The history of unionization in-
dicates that considerable conflict was evident in acceptance by the police
of their status as employees, rather than public servants. The latter has
implications for the strength of the concept of unionism among the police
force, and perhaps also explains why the political context favored fire-
fighters over police, in terms of minimum manning being a mandatory rather
than permissible subject of bargaining only for firefighters.
The power of the unions, both in the ability to influence others, and
to influence the membership, was different and affected the formulation of
objectives. As was seen through the nature of the work, the trade-offs im-
posed different types of costs, not in employment versus wage per se, but
in their affects on working conditions. Thus not only was the police union
less powerful but the costs of one alternative, the layoffs, was much higher.
There was another point which may have had influence and that was the
interrelationship between the public and the work of the police. Support
of the community is important for carrying out of police duties, the main-
tenance of order, if not law. Such support is less critical for the fire-
fighters, both because their contact is more limited. The implication was
that for police, not only did acceptance of the proposal provide what they
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hoped to be was power for future negotiations, but it also enhanced the
achievement of their work.
Thus, in order to identify the specific threat to the union, and thus
the nature of the means by which it could be preserved, knowledge of the
technical context as well as the meaning of "union" given the history and
power was necessary, neither of which can be said to have been critically
identified in the literature. What had been predicted was (a) from Ross,
the necessity of looking into the union as an organization and the nature
of the internal dynamics as they related to the external world. (b) also
from Ross, the importance of survival to the organization, (c) the import-
ance of power, in influencing goals as well as providing the ability to ob-
tain them, as described by Levi and others, and (d) the range of power re-
sources in the public sector beyond the economic which are available for
union utilization, including those derived from mutual interest between
management and employees.
The question remains of what can be generalized from Belmont to the
broader context in terms of whether union goal formulation includes a trade-
off between wages and employment and if so, what the determining factors
are for a choice between the two. Public and private sector relations are
fundamentally different in one respect; under market competition, a trade-
off between wage and employment level is inherently part of the context and
cannot be escaped in the long run. It is likely that Ross is correct in
indicating that the links are sufficiently unclear at the local level, and
that other factors dictate that absolute wage level is not critical so that
the trade-off is essentially irrelevant to the nature of union demands at
the bargaining table. In the public sector, the links between the two are
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even further removed, and the environmental context itself does not contain
a specific trade-off between wage and employment. The determination of the
level of each is essentially a political and social decision, (though the
overall economic context is obviously not totally irrelevant). The impact
of wage level on employment therefore cannot be incorporated into the decision
area of a public sector union. A trade-off between the two is always spec-
ifically imposed. The answer to what Ross was essentially concerned--the
incorporation of a trade-off in determining the wage demand of a union--
is negative, and thus concurs with him but for different reasons which lie
in the nature of government as employer.
The imposition of fiscal constraint does not alter the nature of de-
cision-making in the public sector, and thus concern with eventual unemploy-
ment will not be part of the determination of wage demand by a union. The
imposition of specific trade-off however, as is likely to occur under fis-
cal constraints creates a different question--that of outcome, and was the
motivation for looking at the Belmont police and fire unions. The Belmont
situation is unique in some ways which make the findings from the case ir-
relevant to the broader question. The unions, and the town, were faced with
a luxury which is abnormal to the conditions associated with fiscal crisis;
the relatively minor wage reduction could prevent all layoffs. This meant
that considerations such as job change could become important. To many
other unions, the magnitude of the layoffs proposed (and required by real
fiscal distress) is such that any wage reduction would be drastic and not
necessarily eliminate major layoffs. The options would be more limited and
thus the choice clearer.
The Belmont case is not totally irrelevant in some important respects.
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For one, it reflected the change in power distribution between management
and union that arose out of fiscal constraint, both through the nature of
its imposition (public vote) and in justification for taking firm control
and affecting changes. Such a shift in the balance of power (no matter how
that balance was perceived before) is not unique to Belmont or Massachusetts.
For unions, this means that whatever relationships had been developed with
managment will be disrupted, and negotiations will be even further thrust
into a context of struggle for control. For another, the case highlighted
the need to expand the boundaries of where the important determinates might
be, with both actors and institutions. Not only was the external legal sys-
tem critical, but the state government -was looked to as a means of elimin-
ating the imposition of the trade-off'. (Through state aid to municipalities).
In the New York City fiscal crisis, the role of other actors, particularly
the bankers and state and federal government, was critical to affecting the
options within which unions could move. The introduction of other actors
can help or hinder a union's position; certainly relief from fiscal stress
alleviates the magnitude of trade-offs, but frequently only with large con-
cessions demanded of unions.
The most significant factor to be learned from the Belmont case is
the importance, and difficulty, of determining what the imposed trade-off
really means. Wages and employment, the obvious trade-off, may not reflect
the real costs perceived by the unions. The impact of layoffs on internal
organization such as that in the police union, may not be the relevant fac-
tor in the other situations (particularly under greater fiscal constraint
when such affects will arise no matter which alternative is chosen); however,
other such unforeseen impacts may play as a critical' a role. Certainly in
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New York, the impact of city default on the viability of the unions' pension
funds was a significant consideration in the unions' decision to make cost
concessions, apart from unemployment considerations. If anything, the im-
portance of such other trade-offs render generalization more difficult; the
outcome cannot be predicted in absence of understanding the full costs of
loss of wages or membership.
Certainly the above finding also includes the necessity of determining
how a concept of union differs from the reality of a local organization,
particularly in relation to the motivation for survival. The trade-off may
call into question issues of symbolic power of unions (such as the integrity
of the union contract and the reletive height of wages) which may deviate
from the such power in realtiy.
Other issues with broader significance arose out of exploration of
the Belmont case. One is the significance of the meaning of work beyond
that as a source of income.- Quality of work life has become of greater con-
cern in the last decade, but it has been attacked at times as a luxury and
not relevant in relation to the more critical issues of income. The Belmont
situation does not negate the importance of "bread-and-butter" issues (in
part because of the lack of real fiscal distress), but it does indicate that
concern for the nature of work and workplace organization is broader, and
more fundamental, that might be perceived, even under cutback situations.
An initial expectation which motivated this study was that the fis-
cal constraint imposed on municipalities would lead to an expansion in the
scope of bargaining. Though the Belmont unions each generated alternatives
to eliminate the need for layoffs, neither placed much significance on such
alternatives, except in the use of other municipal funds to cover the layoffs.
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In Walton's terms, "integrative" bargaining never really occurred. That
mutually acceptable alternatives were never generated was in part a result
of the union's suspension of the fiscal need and of the heightened power
struggle under which the negotiations occurred. But it is also relevant
that the unions did not challenge the line between managerial and employee
perogatives. Though the attorneys both believed in the right of the union
to bargain over critical decisions affecting the work place, both unions
accepted managements rights to determine both the level and the means of
services provision.
That the scope of bargaining was not expanded in Belmont has several
implications, particularly for those who seek a resolution to the fiscal
crisis through management/union cooperation, cooperation advocated to in-
crease worker productivity as well as to generate alternatives less injur-
ious than layoffs or wage reductions. For one, the suspension of lack of
fiscal distress, which is not unique to Belmont, meant that the cutback
process was perceived as struggle for control. The impetus to act in coop-
erative spirit was lessened, and, as the fiscal constraint was not expected
to be permanent, no real need to generate alternatives other than trans-
ferring funds was perceived as necessary. Belief in real fiscal distress
is thus critical though it should be obvious that belief itself is dependent
upon trust, as is cooperation. For another, the unions did not really feel
that it was their right, or their responsibility to generate alternatives.
In the latter case, only if unions perceive that real decision-making power
had been extended, with they respond to an invitation to partake in the re-
sponsibilities of management. It is interesting to wonder whether with in-
creased layoffs and clearer definition of the public employee as a worker,
not as a public servant, whether the desire to be involved in management
decisions will increase.
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